Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Plaintiffs Nina Vikhrieva and Sergey Leshkov allege they are creditors of Stemedica Cell Technologies, Inc., having invested about $20 million in CardioCell and other Stemedica subsidiaries. They allege that Stemedica failed to deliver promised stem cells and funding and on February 4, 2025 transferred all its assets to newly created entities, SanoStem Global, LLC and Duniya SanoStem, Inc., to avoid creditors. These are allegations, not findings. Plaintiffs sued in the Southern District of California on February 27, 2025.
Stemedica filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition on May 5, 2025. In March 2026 the court held the claims against Stemedica were automatically stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) but did not stay claims against other defendants. The Second Amended Complaint pleads Count 6 (intentional fraudulent transfer) and Count 7 (constructive fraudulent transfer) under California's Uniform Voidable Transactions Act against Stemedica, SanoStem, and defendant Shivinder Deol, and Count 8 (aiding and abetting an intentional fraudulent transfer) against Deol and four others. Deol, representing himself, moved to dismiss Counts 6, 7, and 8, the only claims against him.
Plaintiffs did not oppose the motion; they told the court the Chapter 7 trustee regarded all three counts as estate property that should be stayed. The trustee has not appeared. A June 2026 email from the trustee's counsel to Deol asserted that position but also said the trustee was not presently aware of any claim against Deol and did not currently intend to pursue one. Deol asked the court to reach the merits and dismiss with prejudice.
The Court’s Holding
The court held that Counts 6 and 7 are automatically stayed as to every defendant, debtor or not, under § 362(a)(3). Relying on 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), 544(b)(1), and 323 and on Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decisions (Koeberer and Pearlman), it concluded that state-law fraudulent transfer claims become estate property when the petition is filed and that the trustee holds the exclusive right to pursue them. What matters is the nature of the claims, which seek to avoid Stemedica's own transfer, not the identity of the defendant.
Count 8 was treated differently. It is not automatically stayed under § 362(a)(1) because its defendants are neither alleged transferees nor alleged indemnitees of the debtor. The court declined to decide whether Count 8 is estate property under § 362(a)(3): no cited authority so holds, a bankruptcy decision (Hamilton Taft) reasoned that § 544(b) does not let a trustee assert such a claim, and the bankruptcy court is better placed to decide. It stayed Count 8 anyway under its inherent Landis authority. Prejudice to Deol is limited, since he may seek relief from stay or abandonment in bankruptcy court. Plaintiffs would face hardship litigating a claim that may belong to the estate, and Count 8 depends on the transfer underlying Counts 6 and 7, so proceeding risks inconsistent rulings before discovery has begun.
The Count 8 stay lasts only while the automatic stay on Counts 6 and 7 remains. Joint status reports are due by October 28, 2026 and every 90 days afterward, and any party may move to lift the stay. The court declined to reach the merits and denied Deol's motion to dismiss without prejudice, with leave to renew within 30 days after the stay is lifted. It rejected dismissal with prejudice because plaintiffs may again enforce the claims if the trustee abandons them. Claims against Stemedica remain stayed; all other claims proceed on schedule.
Key Takeaways
- State-law fraudulent transfer claims can be automatically stayed under § 362(a)(3) as to non-debtor defendants once the transferor's trustee holds them as estate property.
- Aiding-and-abetting claims against non-debtors who are neither transferees nor indemnitees are not automatically stayed under § 362(a)(1), and estate ownership was left open.
- A court may stay a dependent claim under Landis when its predicate claims sit in bankruptcy, and this stay is tied to the automatic stay with 90-day status reports.
- A defendant seeking to move forward can ask the bankruptcy court for relief from stay or abandonment rather than asking the district court to dismiss stayed claims.
- Failure to oppose a motion under the local rule is not binding consent, so it did not justify granting a motion aimed at stayed claims.
Why It Matters
This district court order is not reported and is not binding precedent, but it applies recent Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel authority to a creditor's pending fraudulent transfer suit against non-debtors and shows how a court can separate estate claims from related claims paused only in its discretion.
Nothing was decided on the merits. Whether the 2025 transfer was fraudulent, whether Count 8 belongs to the estate, and whether any claim against Deol survives remain open.