Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Stephen Alexander Miller, who is unrepresented, sued the County of San Diego, Deputy Shawn Gurren, Teena Pizza, Inc., and Correctional Healthcare Partners, Inc. (CHP) after his February 2025 arrest. The first amended complaint, taken as true for this motion, alleges that unnamed individuals at a Vista restaurant tackled and strangled him and forcefully pulled his left arm. Deputy Gurren then arrested him despite his statements that he had just been attacked and his complaints of severe arm and shoulder pain, which he believed was a dislocated shoulder.
After booking, Miller alleged, one nurse took a brief look at him without arranging outside medical attention, and another later gave him over-the-counter medication, again without outside care. He spent about fourteen hours in detention still in pain, and unspecified individuals responsible for intake screening, medical screening, custody supervision, and detention care allegedly knew of the injury but did not secure prompt treatment. He was released without meaningful treatment but did not allege new injuries. After Miller sued in April 2026 and amended as of right, CHP answered and moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) on Count III, the only claim against it: a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for inadequate medical care during booking and pretrial detention.
The Court’s Holding
Chief Judge Cynthia Bashant granted the motion. Applying the same plausibility test used under Rule 12(b)(6), the court noted that CHP appeared to concede that it is a private entity acting under color of state law and proceeded on that basis. Under Tsao v. Desert Palace, the Monell framework governs private entities acting under color of state law, so CHP cannot be liable merely because it employs a wrongdoer. Miller had to plead that an official CHP policy or custom was the moving force behind his injury.
The complaint did not do so. It described two nurses' handling of Miller's care and referred generally to unnamed individuals, and the court found it unclear whether CHP or the County employed them. Even if CHP did, employment alone is not enough. The policy allegations in Count IV, pleaded only against the County, identified no CHP-specific policy or custom. Miller's opposition said he needed discovery on whether CHP had policies delaying outside hospital treatment, but the court would not consider facts raised only in a brief, and it held that the single incident pleaded cannot support Monell liability. It therefore did not reach the underlying constitutional question.
The court rejected CHP's argument that amendment would be futile, reasoning that a respondeat superior theory in the current pleading does not mean no set of facts could state a claim. It granted the motion without prejudice and with leave to amend, permitting a Second Amended Complaint by November 4, 2026. Miller may not add new parties or claims without leave. If he does not file by the deadline, the claims against CHP will be dismissed without further leave, and if an amended Count III remains inadequate, leave may not be granted again.
Key Takeaways
- A private company providing jail medical care under color of state law is judged under Monell, so it cannot be held liable under section 1983 simply because it employs the person who allegedly provided inadequate care.
- To plead entity liability, a plaintiff must identify a policy, practice, or custom of the private entity that was the moving force behind the violation, and one isolated incident does not establish a custom.
- A plaintiff cannot cure a deficient complaint through statements in an opposition brief, even when unrepresented, and the court will not supply missing facts or legal theories.
- The ruling is a non-final grant without prejudice and with leave to amend, and the court warned that a further failure to plead adequately may end leave to amend.
- The court did not decide whether the medical care Miller received was constitutionally inadequate.
Why It Matters
This is a district court order applying established Ninth Circuit law, so it does not bind other courts. It shows that alleging poor medical care in custody and naming the contractor is not enough; the complaint must tie the harm to the contractor's own policy, practice, or custom rather than to individual treatment decisions.
The order resolves only Count III against CHP, and only at the pleading stage. It does not address the claims against the other defendants, and whether Miller can plead a CHP policy or custom remains open and depends on any Second Amended Complaint.