Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Stephen Alexander Miller, proceeding pro se, sued the County of San Diego, a sheriff's deputy, a restaurant operator, and a correctional healthcare company over events following his February 2025 arrest. The County moved to dismiss the claims against it in his First Amended Complaint, which he filed as a matter of course in April 2026. The order recites the facts as allegations, which the court accepted as true for the motion.
According to the complaint, Miller was eating at a Vista restaurant when unnamed individuals tackled and strangled him and forcefully pulled his left arm. He alleges that a deputy who arrived arrested him despite his report of an attack and visible pain, and that he repeatedly said he believed his shoulder was dislocated. In detention he allegedly spent about fourteen hours in severe pain. One nurse took a brief look, another gave him over-the-counter medication, and no outside care was arranged. He does not claim new injuries after release.
Miller also alleges that a silver necklace worth about $300 was not returned with his property and was absent from his release paperwork. He asserted three Section 1983 claims against the County: inadequate medical care during booking and pretrial detention (Count III), municipal liability based on a list of policies and customs (Count IV), and deprivation of property without due process (Count VIII). The court treated Monell as a theory of liability rather than a standalone cause of action and construed Count IV that way given his pro se status. It also declined to consider new facts raised only in his opposition brief.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the motion as to Counts III, IV, and VIII. It first held that the claims fail to the extent they rest on respondeat superior. Count III depends on the conduct of unnamed nurses and other staff, and Count VIII on that of the deputy or other county employees. A municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 merely because it employs the person who caused the harm. Liability therefore turns on whether the injuries were inflicted under an official County policy, custom, or practice that was the moving force behind the violation.
The court found the complaint's list of policies conclusory. Count IV alleged failures to ensure prompt outside medical evaluation, tolerance of inadequate staff responses, inadequate training, supervision, and discipline, and ratification of misconduct. It offered no facts showing these practices were entrenched and identified no similar incidents. At most it pleaded one isolated incident, which does not establish a custom under Ninth Circuit authority. The court noted that the reference to body-worn camera muting appeared irrelevant because the complaint contained no allegations about body-worn cameras. Because the policy-or-custom element failed, the court did not reach the underlying constitutional questions.
The dismissal is without prejudice and with leave to amend, not a final judgment. The County had not requested dismissal with prejudice, and the court could not conclude amendment would be futile, applying extra liberality to a pro se litigant. Miller may file a Second Amended Complaint by November 4, 2026, may not add new parties or claims without leave of court, and was warned that further leave may be denied if the amendment remains deficient. If he files nothing, the claims against the County will be dismissed without further leave or notice.
Key Takeaways
- A county cannot be held liable under Section 1983 simply because it employs the people who allegedly caused the harm.
- A Monell claim requires facts showing an official policy or a longstanding, consistent practice that was the moving force behind the injury.
- A single incident, standing alone, is ordinarily insufficient to plead a municipal custom.
- Pro se status earns liberal construction and leave to amend, but the court will not supply missing facts or legal theories, and facts added only in an opposition brief are not considered.
- The order resolves only the County's motion, so the claims against the other defendants were not addressed here.
Why It Matters
The order applies familiar Monell pleading standards to a custody-injury case. It shows that a detailed account of one person's treatment, however sympathetic, does not by itself plausibly allege a county-wide policy. A plaintiff must plead facts such as similar incidents or other indications that the practice is permanent and well settled.
This is a pleading-stage district court order with limited precedential force. Whether Miller can allege facts supporting a policy or custom, and whether his medical-care and property claims have merit, remain open.