Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Denell Caver is the plaintiff in a civil action in the Eastern District of California, Case No. 1:25-cv-01069, against Jeff Macomber and other defendants. On September 2, 2026, the court issued an order to show cause (ECF No. 26) directing Caver to explain in writing why Defendant Paula Michelini should not be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Rule 4(m) governs the time limit for serving a defendant, and the show-cause order gave the plaintiff a chance to respond before any dismissal on that ground. The discharge order does not describe the service history, and the court made no finding about whether Michelini was or was not properly served.
On September 8, 2026, Caver filed a timely response (ECF Nos. 29 and 30) in which he asked to dismiss Michelini without prejudice. The court did not treat the response as a showing of good cause or as a request that required it to decide anything about service. In an order signed October 15, 2026 and filed October 16, 2026, Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone instead discharged the show-cause order and read the response as a notice of voluntary dismissal as to Michelini only.
The Court’s Holding
The court's reasoning rests on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Quoting Commercial Space Management Co. v. Boeing Co., 193 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999), which in turn quotes Wilson v. City of San Jose, 111 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1997), the order explains that a plaintiff has an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss his action before the defendant serves an answer or a motion for summary judgment. It also relies on Commercial Space for the points that a Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal is effective on filing, requires no court order, leaves the parties as though no action had been brought, and leaves the district court without jurisdiction to do anything about it. The order adds a see also citation to Pedrina v. Chun, 987 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1993).
Applying that rule, the court noted that Michelini had not filed an answer, another responsive pleading, or a motion for summary judgment, which placed the case within the plaintiff's unilateral right to dismiss. The court therefore ordered that the September 2, 2026 order to show cause is discharged and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate Michelini as a defendant. The order records that the plaintiff's request was for dismissal without prejudice. It does not dismiss with prejudice, does not decide the Rule 4(m) question the show-cause order had raised, and does not reach the merits of any claim against Michelini.
Key Takeaways
- A plaintiff may dismiss a defendant under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) as of right until that defendant serves an answer or a motion for summary judgment, and this order notes that Michelini had filed neither.
- A Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal takes effect on filing, so the court's role is limited to recognizing it and updating the docket, here by discharging the show-cause order and terminating the defendant.
- A court may construe a plaintiff's response to a Rule 4(m) show-cause order as a notice of voluntary dismissal when the response asks to dismiss the unserved defendant.
- The order affects only Michelini; Jeff Macomber and the other named defendants are not addressed, and the order makes no ruling on the merits of any claim.
Why It Matters
This is a short, unpublished district court order by a magistrate judge, so it carries no precedential weight. It is useful mainly as an illustration of how a court in the Eastern District of California can close out a Rule 4(m) show-cause proceeding when a plaintiff chooses to drop an unserved defendant. The legal authority it applies comes from Ninth Circuit decisions, and the order adds no new rule.
What remains open is substantial. The claims against the remaining defendants continue under the same case number. The order does not say whether Caver may later sue Michelini again, and any later claim would depend on timing rules and other defenses that the court did not address. Because the dismissal was requested without prejudice, nothing in the order bars a future filing, but the court made no finding on that point beyond recording the request.