Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
L.E. L.L., an immigration detainee proceeding under a pseudonym, petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a writ of habeas corpus against Minga Wofford and other respondents. Respondents argued that Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) as an applicant for admission and was not entitled to relief because he had already received a bond hearing. The magistrate judge rejected the mandatory detention position, noting that Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in May 2023 and eventually settled in Albany, New York, where he lived for more than two years. On that basis the magistrate judge found that he is instead subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Petitioner received a bond hearing on August 28, 2025, so the question was whether he was entitled to a second one. The magistrate judge applied the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, which the Ninth Circuit used in Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189 (9th Cir. 2022), reasoning that Petitioner is subject to the same detention authority as the petitioner there. Finding that the Mathews factors did not weigh in favor of a second hearing, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal. Petitioner objected, arguing that the factors favor him and that he is entitled to a new individualized hearing at which the Government bears the burden of proof, based on the duration and circumstances of his detention.
The Court’s Holding
The district court performed de novo review under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and concluded that the findings and recommendations were supported by the record and proper analysis. It found Petitioner's circumstances similar to those in Rodriguez Diaz, where the detainee had been held fourteen months after his first bond hearing. The Ninth Circuit there recognized a legitimate and reasonably strong private liberty interest, yet found that the Mathews factors weighed against a due process violation. Consistent with that analysis, the court held that the magistrate judge did not err in finding that the second and third Mathews factors weigh against a second bond hearing.
The court concluded that Petitioner did not show a due process violation and that dismissal was appropriate, citing Rodriguez Diaz, where the Ninth Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss. It adopted the findings and recommendations, dismissed the petition without prejudice, terminated Respondents' motion as moot, and directed the Clerk to close the case. The order does not separately discuss the first Mathews factor, does not state how long Petitioner has been detained since his hearing, and does not shift the burden of proof to the Government. The disposition is a dismissal without prejudice, not a ruling on the merits of any future claim.
Key Takeaways
- A district court may adopt a magistrate judge's finding that a detainee who entered without inspection and lived in the interior for more than two years is held under discretionary authority in § 1226(a) rather than mandatory authority in § 1225(b).
- In this court, a § 1226(a) detainee's request for a second bond hearing after an earlier hearing is analyzed under the Mathews v. Eldridge factors as applied in Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland.
- A strong private liberty interest does not by itself require a second hearing when the second and third Mathews factors weigh against one.
- Petitioner's request for a new hearing with the burden on the Government was not granted.
- The dismissal is without prejudice, but the order describes no circumstances under which a renewed petition would succeed.
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished district court order and carries no precedential weight. It shows how an Eastern District of California judge is applying Rodriguez Diaz to a detainee who has already had one bond hearing. The court treated the Ninth Circuit's fourteen-month post-hearing detention comparison as controlling guidance and rejected the argument that the passage of time alone calls for a new hearing.
Much remains open. The order is brief and relies on the magistrate judge for the detailed Mathews analysis. It does not decide whether materially longer detention or changed circumstances might warrant a different result. Because the dismissal is without prejudice, it is not a merits bar to a later petition, though the order does not address what such a petition would need to show.