Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Manny Santiago Cabeje sued the Commissioner of Social Security in the Eastern District of California in a Social Security matter. On September 28, 2026, the court remanded the case to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and judgment was entered the same day. Both parties had consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), so the magistrate judge decided the fee request without referral to a district judge.
On October 15, 2026, the parties filed a stipulated motion asking the court to award Plaintiff's counsel $9,250.00 in attorney fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Plaintiff sought the award as the prevailing party, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) and (d)(1)(A), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The Commissioner did not oppose the requested relief. The order was issued on October 16, 2026, the day after the motion was filed.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the stipulated motion in full. It treated Plaintiff as a prevailing party because a sentence-four remand under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) confers that status, citing Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993). It then applied the statutory framework: under § 2412(d)(1)(A), a prevailing party receives fees unless the government's position was substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust. The court stated that the government did not show its position was substantially justified and that it found no special circumstances. The order does not analyze the merits of the underlying remand or explain the lack of justification beyond that finding.
On the amount, the court relied on the stipulation and found that $9,250.00 in attorney fees and expenses was appropriate. The order contains no independent review of hours or rates. It directs the Commissioner to pay that sum to Plaintiff as the prevailing party. Unless the Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff owes a federal debt, payment is to be made to Plaintiff's counsel in accordance with Plaintiff's assignment of fees and the terms of the stipulated motion.
The award is expressly subject to any offset allowed under the Treasury Offset Program, as discussed in Astrue v. Ratliff. If the Commissioner determines, upon carrying out the order, that no offset applies, the fees are to be delivered to counsel. The order resolves fees only. It does not decide the merits, which return to the agency on remand.
Key Takeaways
- A sentence-four remand under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) makes a Social Security claimant a prevailing party for Equal Access to Justice Act purposes, according to the court's reliance on Shalala v. Schaefer.
- Once a claimant prevails, fees are awarded unless the government's position was substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust; here the court found the government did not make that showing.
- Payment is directed to the plaintiff as prevailing party but may go to counsel under an assignment, and only if the Treasury Department finds no federal debt subject to offset.
- The amount rested on the parties' stipulation, and the order does not independently analyze hours or hourly rates, so it offers limited guidance on how reasonableness is measured.
- This is a short, unreported district court order entered with the parties' consent to a magistrate judge, and it is not binding precedent.
Why It Matters
The order is a routine illustration of how fee requests proceed after a Social Security remand in the Eastern District of California. When the Commissioner does not oppose and the parties agree on a figure, the court may enter a short order that confirms prevailing-party status, makes the statutory findings on substantial justification and special circumstances, and approves the stipulated sum. Its practical effect is limited to this case: it resolves who pays and how much, not whether the agency ultimately awards benefits.
Practitioners should note the payment mechanics. EAJA fees belong to the claimant and are exposed to federal-debt offset, yet the order allows payment to counsel when an assignment exists and no debt is found. One housekeeping point: the caption refers to Doc. 14, while the decretal paragraph grants the stipulated motion at Doc. 23. Because the order is unreported and rests on a stipulation, it should not be read as setting a benchmark for reasonable fees or as an independent examination of the government's litigation position.