Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Roderick Washington, a state prisoner at Centinela State Prison proceeding without counsel, sued S. Deacicu, M.D., and other defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that he was transferred on May 29, 2026 in retaliation for grievances about staff misconduct; that on August 9, 2026 staff refused to copy exhibits needed to oppose an exhaustion-based motion to dismiss in another case; and that on August 21, 2026 staff conspired to fabricate a sex offender designation costing him visitation and school programs. These were allegations only; the court made no findings on them.
Washington did not pay the $405 filing fee (a $350 statutory fee plus a $55 administrative fee that does not apply to in forma pauperis (IFP) litigants) and filed no IFP application, submitting only his inmate trust account statement. The court would ordinarily let an unrepresented litigant file an IFP application, but found that futile given his litigation history and the lack of any plausible imminent-danger allegation.
The governing rule is the Prison Litigation Reform Act's three-strikes provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A prisoner with three or more prior cases dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim generally cannot proceed IFP unless he plausibly alleges imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of filing. The style of a prior dismissal is immaterial; what matters is whether the whole case was dismissed on a qualifying ground.
The Court’s Holding
Relying on PACER dockets, which it judicially noticed under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the court found at least six prior prisoner civil actions dismissed on qualifying grounds: a 1995 Southern District of California dismissal and three 1995 Northern District of California dismissals, all under former § 1915(d); a 1998 Southern District judgment on the pleadings for failure to state a claim; and a 1999 Eastern District dismissal for failure to state a claim. Although defendants ordinarily bear the initial burden of showing strikes, the court held docket records sufficed here. It separately listed nineteen other actions dismissed for nonpayment or under § 1915(g) but did not count them among the six.
Because the strikes were incurred while Washington was incarcerated, he could proceed IFP only by plausibly alleging imminent danger of serious physical injury when he filed. The court held he did not. His complaint described a past transfer, interference with copying, and a fabricated designation. Although he asserted that the designation was meant to endanger his life among prisoners hostile to sex offenders, the court said the exception is for genuine emergencies where a threat is real and proximate, citing decisions that treat speculative threats from registration status as insufficient.
The court dismissed the action sua sponte without prejudice for failure to prepay the fee, denied leave to file an IFP motion under § 1915(g), certified under § 1915(a)(3) that any IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith, and directed the clerk to close the file. It did not reach the merits of the retaliation, access-to-courts, or designation claims and did not grant leave to amend.
Key Takeaways
- A prisoner with three qualifying strikes cannot proceed IFP absent a plausible allegation of imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of filing.
- Courts may judicially notice PACER dockets to identify strikes, and the label on a prior dismissal does not control; what matters is whether it was for frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim.
- Allegations that a sex offender designation could invite harm from other prisoners were treated as speculative and did not satisfy the exception.
- The dismissal here is without prejudice, but the order denies leave to seek IFP status and does not address the merits of the underlying claims.
- The court certified that any IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith.
Why It Matters
This is a non-precedential district court order, but it shows how § 1915(g) operates as a threshold screen, before service and before any examination of the underlying claims. The dismissal rested on fee nonpayment and the strike bar rather than the substance of Washington's allegations, so his retaliation and access-to-courts theories remain undecided.
For incarcerated litigants with long litigation histories, the practical lesson is that a complaint must plead specific, present facts showing a proximate physical threat to invoke the exception; allegations of past mistreatment, administrative designations, or generalized fears of future harm will not suffice. The order does not address whether Washington may refile on payment of the full fee.