Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Rigoberto Godoy, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States on December 15, 2005, without being admitted or paroled. On December 31, 2025, a warrant issued for his arrest and Enforcement and Removal Operations officers apprehended him the same day. He claims he was never shown an order or warrant when he was arrested. After the arrest, the Department of Homeland Security determined he was deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(6)(A)(i), and he was placed in removal proceedings.
An immigration judge held a bond hearing on February 25, 2026, and denied bond, finding that Godoy had failed to establish that he is not a danger or flight risk. The record reflects no appeal of that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. On March 10, 2026, Godoy, proceeding pro se, filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking release from the Otay Mesa Detention Center. The court conditionally appointed the Federal Defenders of San Diego, which, after reviewing the bond hearing audio, told the court it had nothing to add to the petition. Respondents argued that the detention is lawful under § 1226, that the claims are jurisdictionally barred, and that Godoy failed to exhaust. Godoy filed no traverse.
The Court’s Holding
The court first held that it had jurisdiction. Section 1252(g) removes jurisdiction over claims arising from the decision to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders, but the Ninth Circuit reads it narrowly, as reaching only those three discrete actions. Godoy did not challenge the decision or method of commencing removal proceedings, and his detention claims were collateral to the removal process. Based on the limited briefing, the court concluded that jurisdiction existed.
The court then held that Godoy had not exhausted administrative remedies. Where a claim is reviewable by the BIA, a habeas petitioner must ordinarily exhaust first. The requirement is prudential rather than jurisdictional in habeas, and a court may impose it where agency expertise is needed to build a record, relaxing it would encourage bypassing the administrative scheme, or agency review could let the agency correct its own mistakes. A bond determination is directly reviewable by the BIA under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(f) and 1003.38, and nothing indicated that Godoy appealed. He did not contend that BIA review would be inadequate or futile or that irreparable harm would follow, so the court declined to excuse exhaustion.
The court denied the petition without prejudice. It did not decide whether detention under § 1226(a) is lawful, whether the arrest was defective for lack of a warrant, or whether the bond decision was correct. It also declined to address Godoy's complaints about living conditions and monitored communications, reasoning that habeas relief is limited to the legality or duration of confinement.
Key Takeaways
- Section 1252(g) did not bar the petition because the court read it narrowly and treated detention claims as collateral to the removal process.
- A noncitizen held under § 1226(a) who is denied bond by an immigration judge is generally expected to appeal to the BIA before seeking habeas relief in this court.
- Exhaustion in the habeas context is prudential, so a court may excuse it where remedies are inadequate, pursuit would be futile, irreparable injury would result, or the proceedings would be void.
- A petitioner who offers no argument for excusing exhaustion should not expect a waiver, as happened here.
- Dismissal was without prejudice, so Godoy may return to court after exhausting, and the order does not resolve the lawfulness of his detention.
Why It Matters
The order applies settled Ninth Circuit prudential exhaustion principles to an immigration judge's bond denial under § 1226(a). It shows that a detainee may be turned away, even with a pending petition and a Federal Defenders review of the bond hearing, if the available BIA appeal went unused. The petitioner bears the burden of showing why exhaustion should be excused.
This is an unreported district court order and carries no precedential weight. Its jurisdictional ruling rested expressly on limited briefing, and the merits and conditions-of-confinement claims were not reached. Whether any later petition would succeed depends on the outcome of a BIA appeal and on any changed circumstances.