Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Pedro Saucedo Jaimes filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his ongoing immigration detention, together with a motion for a temporary restraining order. Count One raised a statutory claim. It argued that a noncitizen present without admission who is apprehended in the interior of the United States is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and is therefore entitled to a bond hearing before being deprived of liberty.
The court had already decided that question repeatedly. In Alvarez Maciel v. Noem and Barajas Ortiz v. Chestnut it ordered release of people who had lived in the United States for over twenty and over thirty years. In Zuniga Cruz v. Noem it granted a restraining order and habeas relief for a petitioner with eight years of residence. Later orders reached the same result for people with roughly one to four years of residence. Each held that § 1226(a) applies and that a pre-deprivation bond hearing is required.
On October 5, 2026, the court told the parties it was considering ruling directly on the petition. It asked whether they opposed deciding the motion and petition together and whether anything materially distinguished this case from Alvarez Maciel and Barajas Ortiz. Respondents opposed the restraining order on the same grounds rejected before and said they maintain that § 1225(b)(2)(A) governs, but identified no significant factual or legal difference. They did not oppose a direct ruling on the petition, though they tied that position to the limited relief of a bond hearing, and they gave no basis for opposing release. Petitioner also did not oppose.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted both the habeas petition and the restraining order as to Count One. It began from the Ninth Circuit's statement in Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock that noncitizens present without admission who are apprehended in the interior are subject to discretionary detention under § 1226, not mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Because Respondents raised no new argument and no distinguishing facts, the court granted relief for the reasons given in Zuniga Cruz. As in that case, it concluded that the remedy for the failure to provide a statutorily compliant bond hearing is immediate release.
The order requires Petitioner's immediate release. It bars any added restriction, such as electronic monitoring, unless a future pre-deprivation custody hearing finds it necessary. Respondents must return his identification and other documents and possessions on release and file a notice of compliance within three days. If the government seeks to re-detain him, it must first provide a bond hearing under 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), at which Petitioner bears the burden of showing he is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community. The clerk was directed to serve the detention facility, enter judgment for Petitioner and close the case.
Some matters remain open. Because Count One sufficed, the court did not reach the petition's other grounds. It also expressly did not decide when Respondents may detain Petitioner if he becomes subject to an executable final order of removal and receives notice of it. The order is an unreported district court ruling.
Key Takeaways
- Following Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, the court treated noncitizens present without admission and arrested in the interior as subject to discretionary detention under § 1226, not mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
- Where the government offered no new argument and no fact distinguishing the case from the court's earlier rulings, the court resolved the restraining order and the habeas petition together, with neither side objecting.
- The court treated immediate release, not merely a future bond hearing, as the remedy for the missing statutory bond hearing.
- Release comes without electronic monitoring or other conditions unless a later custody hearing finds them necessary, and any re-detention requires a bond hearing at which Petitioner bears the burden on flight risk and danger.
- The ruling leaves the petition's other counts and detention after an executable final removal order undecided.
Why It Matters
The order shows how this district judge is applying a settled line of rulings to new habeas petitions, now supported by the Ninth Circuit's Rodriguez Vazquez decision. When the government repeats its § 1225(b)(2)(A) position without distinguishing facts, the court is willing to grant relief on the existing reasoning, including where the petitioner had lived in the country only a year or two.
The practical effect is limited to this petitioner. The government keeps the ability to seek re-detention through a bond hearing in which the detainee carries the burden, and the final-removal-order scenario is left undecided. As a non-precedential district court order, it may be cited for persuasive value but does not bind other judges.