Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Arnulfo Andres Borrego Andrades is an immigration detainee held by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the Mesa Verde Detention Facility in Bakersfield, California. Proceeding pro se, he petitioned the Eastern District of California for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his ongoing detention during removal proceedings. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The order describes the petition as presenting a due process claim but does not decide it.
To better ascertain the basis of the detention and evaluate that claim, the court directed Respondents to respond to the petition and to attach any records necessary to resolve it. When the order issued, the response was not yet due.
On October 7, 2026, Petitioner moved for appointed counsel, citing the complexity of immigration law and his belief that the petition is likely to succeed. Those are his contentions, not findings. Magistrate Judge Helena M. Barch-Kuchta signed the order on October 11, 2026, and it was docketed on October 13, 2026.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the motion for appointment of counsel without prejudice. That is a ruling only on the request for counsel. The petition remains pending, the court did not decide whether the detention is lawful, and nothing in the order is a final judgment on any claim. The without-prejudice denial leaves the counsel question open on a later record.
The court began with the rule that there is no constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings. It noted that under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, it may appoint counsel for a financially eligible person seeking relief under § 2241 when the interests of justice so require. In deciding, it considers the petitioner's likelihood of success on the merits and his ability to articulate claims pro se given the complexity of the legal issues, citing Wilborn v. Escalderon. Appointment is also required if the court authorizes discovery and counsel is necessary for effective discovery, or if it finds an evidentiary hearing is warranted, under Rules 6(a) and 8(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which may be applied to other habeas petitions.
Applying those principles, the court found that at this early stage, with Respondents' response not yet due, it could not conclude Petitioner had shown a likelihood of success. Because Respondents were directed to attach the records needed to resolve the petition, it was not yet clear whether discovery or an evidentiary hearing would be required. And although Petitioner cited the complexity of immigration law, he had adequately filed a petition setting out facts and supporting legal authority coherently. On the present record, the court did not find appointment necessary to prevent a due process violation.
Key Takeaways
- There is no constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings, but a court may appoint counsel for a financially eligible § 2241 petitioner when the interests of justice so require.
- The court weighs the petitioner's likelihood of success on the merits and his ability to articulate claims pro se in light of the complexity of the issues.
- A coherent pro se petition that sets out facts and supporting legal authority weighs against appointment, even where the petitioner points to the complexity of immigration law.
- Appointment can become required if the court authorizes discovery and counsel is necessary for effective discovery, or if it finds an evidentiary hearing is warranted; this order found it was not yet clear either would occur.
- The denial is without prejudice and the petition remains undecided, so the order resolves nothing about the legality of the detention.
Why It Matters
This is a short, unpublished magistrate judge order on a preliminary motion, so it carries no precedential weight and decides no question about the lawfulness of immigration detention. Its value is as an illustration of how one court applies the Wilborn considerations when a detainee asks for counsel before the government has responded to a § 2241 petition.
The reasoning is tied to timing. The court relied on the early stage of the case, the outstanding response and records, and the quality of the petition itself. The order does not say what would change its view, but its own reasoning points to later developments such as authorized discovery, an evidentiary hearing, or a fuller record on the merits. Whether counsel will ever be appointed, and whether the due process claim has merit, remain open.