Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Christopher John Smith pleaded no contest to grand theft (Penal Code § 487, subd. (a)) on December 17, 2020, and stipulated to an upper term sentence of three years in county jail. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court imposed and suspended the stipulated sentence and placed Smith on two years of formal probation through the reentry court program. Successful participation for at least one year was required to graduate and have the suspended term lifted, while deletion from the program would require him to serve the suspended term.
After Smith absconded from the program, he filed a statement in mitigation on August 13, 2024, asking the trial court to resentence him to no higher than the midterm under the amendments to Penal Code section 1170(b) made by Senate Bill No. 567. At the hearing, the court acknowledged the then-existing split of authority and followed People v. Mitchell (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1051 (Mitchell I), which held that a stipulated sentence did not require resentencing. The court denied Smith's request, granted the People's request to delete him from the program because he had absconded, terminated probation, and executed the stipulated three-year upper term.
Smith timely appealed, and the Court of Appeal previously affirmed the judgment. The matter is now before the Third Appellate District on transfer from the California Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729 (Mitchell II), which held that Senate Bill No. 567's amendments apply retroactively to stipulated plea-agreement sentences in cases not final on appeal. In accordance with the Supreme Court's directions, the Court of Appeal vacated its earlier decision; the parties did not file supplemental briefs.
The Court’s Holding
Senate Bill No. 567, effective January 1, 2022, amended section 1170 to make the middle term the presumptive prison term. A court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when circumstances in aggravation justify it and the underlying facts have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or by a judge in a court trial. The sole issue on appeal was whether those heightened requirements applied to Smith's stipulated suspended sentence.
The court concluded they did. Under Mitchell II, the amendments apply retroactively to stipulated upper-term sentences imposed pursuant to plea agreements in cases not final on appeal, and reversal and remand are required unless the defendant validly waived the new requirements when entering the plea. Smith pleaded in 2020, several years before the amendment, so he could not and did not waive requirements that did not yet exist.
The judgment was therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. On remand, Smith may either waive or invoke section 1170(b)'s requirements. If he reaffirms the plea bargain and waives the new rights, the court must reinstate the original negotiated sentence; if he declines, the parties may agree to modify the bargain and seek approval of a downward departure, or Smith may withdraw his assent, have the plea set aside, and return with the prosecution to a pre-plea posture, free to renegotiate or proceed to trial.
Key Takeaways
- A stipulated upper-term sentence in a case not final on appeal is subject to Senate Bill No. 567's amended section 1170(b) requirements under Mitchell II.
- Smith's 2020 plea could not waive statutory requirements that had not yet been enacted, so no valid waiver existed.
- Reaffirming the bargain with a valid waiver requires the trial court to reinstate the original negotiated sentence.
- If Smith invokes the new requirements, the parties may seek an approved modification or he may withdraw his assent and return to a pre-plea posture.
- The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded; it did not itself reduce Smith's sentence to the midterm.
Why It Matters
The opinion applies the California Supreme Court's Mitchell II framework to a negotiated sentence that had been suspended during reentry-court probation and later executed after Smith absconded. It confirms that a stipulated disposition does not by itself prevent retroactive application of amended section 1170(b) in a nonfinal case.
The remand preserves the choices specified by Mitchell II rather than automatically reducing Smith's sentence. The trial court's next steps depend on whether Smith waives the new requirements and reaffirms the bargain, the parties obtain approval of a modification, or Smith withdraws his assent and the plea is set aside.