Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Marcus Anthony DeSouza was convicted by a jury of assault with a deadly weapon and misdemeanor assault arising from a May 10, 2024 incident in a supermarket parking lot. Trial testimony showed DeSouza yelled at A.F., who was sitting on her car's bumper, and hit her in the face and chest after she told him to stay away. When A.F.'s fiancé C.G. emerged from the store, DeSouza smashed a glass bottle on a cart rack and made slashing motions at C.G. with the broken bottle before fleeing; police arrived after a brief chase and struggle.
At trial, A.F. testified DeSouza was yelling 'crazy stuff' and that someone told her he 'has a mental illness'; C.G. called his behavior 'erratic' 11 times. The prosecutor did not object. During deliberations the jury said it had decided one count and was deadlocked on the other. Jurors Nos. 10 and 12 told the bailiff that Juror No. 11 was refusing to follow instructions and would not change her mind. The court questioned those jurors and then Juror No. 11, who acknowledged her family's mental-health history affected her view but said she was basing her vote on the evidence and witness statements about behavior they had seen.
The trial court excused Juror No. 11 over defense objection under Penal Code section 1089, finding good cause because she was considering evidence she should not and would not commit to setting aside her mental-health considerations. An alternate was seated; the reconstituted jury convicted on both counts. The court imposed the middle term of three years on the deadly-weapon count and 180 days concurrent on the misdemeanor, and denied DeSouza's new-trial motion challenging the removal.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial. Although juror removal is reviewed for abuse of discretion, a juror's inability to perform must be shown as a 'demonstrable reality,' a stronger showing than mere substantial evidence, and the reviewing court must be confident the trial court's conclusion is manifestly supported by the evidence it relied on. Under that standard, the record does not support as a demonstrable reality the finding that Juror No. 11 was unable to perform her duties.
DeSouza's mental health was part of the trial evidence: A.F.'s testimony about 'crazy stuff' and mental illness and C.G.'s repeated 'erratic' descriptions. Juror No. 11 could give that testimony whatever weight she thought appropriate and draw on her personal experience with a family member's mental-health issues. It is not misconduct for a juror to interpret evidence through her own life experience, and jurors cannot be expected to divorce their background entirely from their analysis.
The court rejected the People's bias argument: bias turns on whether the juror's judgment is untethered to the facts presented at trial, and here her concerns were based on admitted testimony. Even if she misunderstood the defense, misanalyzed the case, or believed further discussion would not change her mind, those are not grounds for discharge. The trial court's instructions to Juror No. 11 were factually wrong (mental-health evidence was in the record) and legally wrong (she should not have been told to set aside her experience); supplemental instructions clarifying the law would have been the proper course.
Key Takeaways
- Removing a deliberating juror requires a demonstrable reality of inability to perform duties, a stronger showing than substantial evidence.
- A juror may rely on personal life experience in evaluating evidence without committing misconduct.
- Mental-health testimony admitted without objection may be weighed by jurors even in a general-intent prosecution.
- A juror who has deliberated a reasonable time may not be discharged merely for saying further discussion will not change her view.
- When a juror's focus on particular evidence raises concerns, the court should consider supplemental instructions clarifying the law before removing the juror.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces the heightened demonstrable-reality standard for removing a deliberating juror whose views rest on evidence actually presented at trial plus personal experience, confirming that disagreement with the majority, faulty logic, or a firm belief that further discussion will not help are not grounds for discharge.
It also shows the value of supplemental instructions when confusing evidence surfaces mid-deliberation: the trial court could have clarified the law on mental-health evidence and general intent rather than declaring the evidence absent and removing the juror. Justice Renner dissented, arguing the record manifestly supported removal because Juror No. 11 expressly refused to follow instructions; the majority held her concerns were tethered to admitted testimony and did not meet the demonstrable-reality standard.