California Case Summaries

People v. Peterson — Court affirms triple-murder convictions, rejecting sufficiency, juror-misconduct, Racial Justice Act, and ineffective-assistance challenges

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
People v. Peterson
Court
2nd District Court of Appeal
Judge
TAMZARIAN; ZUKIN; MORI
Date Decided
2026-11-16
Docket No.
B340458
Status
Unreported / Non-Citable
Topics
criminal law, attempted robbery, felony murder, juror misconduct, Racial Justice Act, ineffective assistance of counsel, sufficiency of evidence

Background

Kenneth Peterson and Travis Reid separately appealed their convictions for three counts of first degree murder and one count of attempted robbery arising from the February 2019 fatal shootings of Gary Davidson, Jesus Perez, and Benito Lopez at Davidson's Porter Ranch residence. The prosecution's theory was that Reid, a Maryland drug dealer, sought to rob Davidson over hundreds of thousands of dollars in missing cash shipments Reid believed Davidson had stolen, and that Peterson knowingly assisted the robbery by obtaining silencers and accompanying Reid to California.

At trial, the jury heard sharply conflicting testimony: Reid maintained he traveled to California solely to resolve a disputed drug transaction without intending to rob Davidson, while Peterson testified he procured silencers merely as a personal favor without knowledge of Reid's criminal plans. The prosecution substantiated its case through courier Gregory Palmer, who transported firearms and silencers across the country under a leniency agreement, acquaintance Chaqueta Cook, who observed Reid and Peterson disposing of wrapped items following the shootings, and extensive ballistics and phone records.

During deliberations, the trial court declined to discharge Juror No. 2 following an inquiry into deliberative conduct, and the jury subsequently convicted both men on all charges. The trial court sentenced each defendant to three consecutive terms of life imprisonment without parole plus firearm enhancements, and denied their new trial motions asserting juror misconduct and Racial Justice Act violations. On appeal, Peterson separately claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney omitted unsworn juror interview statements concerning racial remarks and outside research from the new trial declaration.

The Court’s Holding

The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgments, holding that substantial evidence supported both appellants' attempted robbery convictions and Peterson's first degree murder convictions under a felony-murder theory. Reid took a direct step toward robbery by arming himself with a silenced weapon and following Davidson home to reclaim money, while the crime scene ballistics, unspent hotel cartridges, and firearm procurement sufficiently corroborated Palmer's accomplice testimony. Furthermore, Peterson aided the robbery and qualified as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life under People v. Banks and People v. Clark by procuring and repairing specialized silencers, handling ammunition, accompanying Reid to the scene where victims were restrained, and concealing firearms in a storm drain afterward.

The appellate court also held that the trial court properly denied the new trial motions premised on juror misconduct. Averments that male jurors aggressively advocated guilt and refused to change their minds showed vigorous deliberation rather than an impermissible refusal to deliberate. Additionally, juror declarations alleging that the panel misconstrued felony-murder aiding and abetting requirements reflected the jury's internal, subjective deliberative processes and were strictly barred from impeaching the verdict under Evidence Code section 1150.

On the Racial Justice Act claims, the court concluded that appellants forfeited their challenges by failing to articulate how an objective observer would view a juror's comment regarding 'these kinds of people' as racially coded. Setting aside forfeiture, appellants failed to make a prima facie showing because an objective observer would understand the remark as addressing criminal association rather than race, and claims of hostility toward Juror No. 2 were not linked to race by admissible evidence. Finally, Peterson's ineffective-assistance claim failed because the appellate record did not explain why counsel omitted unsworn juror statements from the formal new-trial declaration or demonstrate the lack of a rational tactical purpose.

Key Takeaways

  • Substantial evidence supports an attempted robbery conviction where the perpetrator arms himself and follows the intended victim to a residence to execute a planned taking, even if the taking is interrupted and uncompleted.
  • Under Penal Code section 189, an accomplice non-killer is liable for felony murder if they acted as a major participant and exhibited reckless indifference to human life under the Banks and Clark framework.
  • When an appellant challenges felony murder instructed on alternative theories, an appellate court will affirm if at least one theory is factually supported and no record evidence shows the jury relied solely on an unsupported theory.
  • Evidence Code section 1150 permits post-verdict evidence of overt, observable juror acts but strictly bars declarations probing the subjective reasoning, collective thought processes, or purported legal misunderstandings of deliberating jurors.
  • A prima facie claim under the Racial Justice Act requires establishing a substantial likelihood that an objective observer, viewing challenged language in its full conversational and factual context, would perceive an explicit or implicit appeal to racial bias.

Why It Matters

This decision underscores the rigorous application of the Banks and Clark factors to modern felony-murder prosecutions, demonstrating that non-killer accomplices who procure, assemble, or test specialized lethal instrumentalities such as silencers face substantial criminal liability even without conclusive forensic proof placing them inside the immediate room of a fatal shooting.

The ruling also provides important guidance on the intersection of post-verdict juror inquiries, Evidence Code section 1150, and the California Racial Justice Act, establishing that ambiguous remarks must be evaluated in light of the surrounding trial context rather than isolated fragments when assessing whether a prima facie showing of racial bias has been established.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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