Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Deyvidy Lua de Oliveira Melo is an immigration detainee held by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the Golden State Annex Detention Facility in McFarland, California. Proceeding without a lawyer, he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his ongoing detention during removal proceedings and asserting a due process claim. The court had already granted him leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
On October 23, 2026, he moved for appointed counsel, explaining that English is not his first language and that immigration law is complex. The court had directed Respondent to respond to the petition and to attach any records needed to resolve it, but that response was not yet due when the order issued. The order is a magistrate judge's ruling on a motion in a pending case and does not decide the merits of the petition.
The court began with the governing framework. There is no constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings, citing Coleman v. Thompson and Anderson v. Heinze. The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, allows appointment for a financially eligible person seeking § 2241 relief when the interests of justice so require. The court considers the petitioner's likelihood of success and his ability to articulate his claims pro se given the complexity of the legal issues, citing Wilborn v. Escalderon. Appointment is also required if the court authorizes discovery and counsel is necessary for effective discovery, or if an evidentiary hearing is warranted, under Rules 6(a) and 8(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which the court may apply to other habeas petitions.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the motion for appointment of counsel without prejudice. It reasoned that at this early stage it could not conclude Petitioner had shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Respondent's response was not yet due, and the court had ordered a response to better ascertain the basis of the detention and evaluate the due process claim.
The court also found it unclear whether discovery or an evidentiary hearing would be required, because Respondent had been directed to attach records necessary to resolve the petition. The circumstances that would make appointment mandatory therefore had not arisen. On the ability-to-proceed factor, the court acknowledged Petitioner's point about the complexity of immigration law but found he had adequately filed a habeas petition setting out facts and supporting legal authority in a coherent manner. The order does not separately discuss his language point. On the present record, the court did not find appointment necessary to prevent a due process violation.
The only relief ordered was denial of the motion, expressly without prejudice. This is not a final judgment: the habeas petition remains pending, Respondent's response is still to come, and the legality of the detention is undecided. Magistrate Judge Helena M. Barch-Kuchta signed the order on October 27, 2026.
Key Takeaways
- There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in federal habeas proceedings, but the Criminal Justice Act permits appointment for a financially eligible § 2241 petitioner when the interests of justice require it.
- Courts weigh the petitioner's likelihood of success and ability to present claims pro se, and the general complexity of immigration law does not by itself compel appointment.
- A coherent pro se petition that sets out facts and supporting legal authority weighs against appointment at the outset of a case.
- Appointment becomes required if discovery is authorized and counsel is necessary for it, or if an evidentiary hearing is warranted, and the court found neither yet shown.
- Because the denial is without prejudice, Petitioner may renew the request as the record develops, such as after Respondent files its response and records.
Why It Matters
The order shows how district courts in the Ninth Circuit treat requests for appointed counsel from immigration detainees seeking habeas relief: as a case-specific, stage-sensitive inquiry rather than an entitlement. A language barrier and the general difficulty of immigration law were not enough where the detainee's own filing was coherent and supported by authority.
It is a short, routine order by a magistrate judge, and nothing in the record shows it is published or precedential. Its practical effect is limited to this case. The merits of the detention challenge remain open, and a renewed motion remains possible if the court later authorizes discovery, sets an evidentiary hearing, or the issues prove harder to present.