Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Thazeuls Thomas Espina-Pernia, proceeding without counsel, filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on October 16, 2026, challenging his detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The same day he moved for a temporary restraining order seeking immediate release. On October 20, the court set a briefing schedule and directed the respondent to identify any provision of law or fact distinguishing the case from several prior decisions of that court, and to state any opposition to the court ruling on the petition itself based on the existing briefing.
The respondent filed an opposition on October 23 and did not oppose a ruling directly on the merits. On the parties' briefing, the court found that petitioner entered the United States around September 20, 2022, was detained by immigration authorities that day, and was paroled into the country. He was re-detained on September 16, 2026, apparently without notice of the reason or a chance to contest it. The respondent argued that petitioner is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), that his only entitlement is a bond hearing, and that he must exhaust administrative remedies.
The Court’s Holding
The court first waived prudential exhaustion, adopting its reasoning in Wu v. Chestnut (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2026) that administrative exhaustion would not cure the due process violation of detention without notice or an individualized assessment. On the argument that petitioner is entitled only to a bond hearing, the court reasoned that because petitioner had earlier been released on parole, he was entitled to notice and pre-deprivation process before re-detention, and none was provided. It relied on its decision in Rocha Chavarria v. Chestnut (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025), which found that a prior release on parole created a liberty interest in continued release. The order does not separately analyze the respondent's § 1226(a) argument; it rests on that due process reasoning.
The court granted the petition and ordered the respondent to release petitioner immediately on the same conditions that applied before his re-detention on or about September 16, 2026. It also enjoined the respondent from re-detaining him for any purpose, absent exigent circumstances, unless he first receives notice and a pre-deprivation bond hearing before an immigration judge, at which the government must justify detention by clear and convincing evidence. The court granted in forma pauperis status, denied the restraining order and appointment-of-counsel motions as moot, and directed entry of judgment and closure of the case. It stated that it granted the petition for independent reasons, not merely because the respondent failed to distinguish prior cases.
Key Takeaways
- In this order, the court treated a prior release on parole as creating a liberty interest that required notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before re-detention.
- The relief is specific to this petitioner: immediate release on prior conditions plus an injunction barring re-detention absent exigent circumstances unless he first receives notice and a bond hearing before an immigration judge.
- At any such hearing the government must justify detention by clear and convincing evidence.
- The court waived prudential exhaustion because exhaustion would not cure a due process violation arising from detention without notice or individualized assessment.
- The court warned that it will begin granting immigration habeas petitions solely where counsel fails to distinguish the cases cited in its minute order, though it did not do so here.
Why It Matters
This is a district court order in a single case, not a published opinion, and it does not bind other courts. It applies the same judge's earlier reasoning in Rocha Chavarria and Wu to a petitioner who was paroled in 2022 and re-detained in 2026. Its value lies in showing how this court is resolving re-detention claims of previously paroled noncitizens and the remedy it is granting: release plus a forward-looking injunction.
Open questions remain. The order does not decide whether § 1226(a) governs petitioner's detention beyond holding that process was due, and it does not address what happens at a future bond hearing. Because the court entered judgment and closed the case, any future re-detention would proceed under the injunction's terms, including the exigent-circumstances exception, whose scope the order does not define. The footnote also signals that the government's failure to distinguish cited decisions may itself lead to relief in future cases.