Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Pro se prisoner Greg S. Van Huisen, incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility, filed a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without paying the $405 filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Instead he moved to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), supported by inmate trust account statements. The complaint named a John Doe U.S. Marine Corps member and the Warden-Acting Director of the California Department of Corrections, ostensibly alleging conspiracy to commit larceny plus two fragmentary causes of action.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act bars a prisoner from proceeding IFP after three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim, unless the prisoner faced imminent danger of serious physical injury. The court explained that the label or procedural posture of a prior dismissal is immaterial; the question is whether the dismissal rang the PLRA bells of frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim.
Although defendants ordinarily bear the initial burden of showing disqualifying prior strikes, the court held that judicially noticeable district court docket records can suffice. Taking judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2), the court identified seven qualifying strikes from Van Huisen's prior Eastern District of California prisoner cases and two Ninth Circuit appeals, including dismissals for failure to state a claim and for legal frivolousness.
The Court’s Holding
The court held that belated notices of voluntary dismissal filed after dismissal orders did not erase two strikes, because the dismissal orders issued first, the notices were never acted upon, and Van Huisen had already objected to the findings and recommendations and elected to stand on his pleadings. The court contrasted Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissals, which cannot count as strikes.
The imminent-danger exception did not apply. The complaint was largely disjointed and unintelligible, and none of its allegations plausibly suggested physical harm ready to take place or hanging threateningly over Van Huisen's head at the time of filing. Nor was there any nexus between any alleged danger and the asserted violations, as the exception requires.
Because Van Huisen had accumulated at least three strikes, could not invoke the imminent-danger exception, and had not paid the filing fee, the court denied the IFP motion as barred by § 1915(g) and dismissed the civil action without prejudice for failure to pay the § 1914(a) fee. The court also certified that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith and directed the Clerk to close the case.
Key Takeaways
- A prisoner with three qualifying PLRA strikes must plausibly allege imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of filing to obtain IFP status, and the alleged danger must stem from the violations asserted in the complaint.
- Courts may rely on judicially noticeable court dockets to establish qualifying prior strikes when defendants have not yet carried their usual evidentiary burden.
- A notice of voluntary dismissal filed after the court has already dismissed without leave to amend does not necessarily prevent the dismissal from counting as a strike, particularly where the prisoner objected to the findings and recommendations and elected to stand on the pleading.
- Denial of an IFP application altogether ordinarily ends the case when the prisoner has not prepaid the statutory filing fee, here resulting in dismissal without prejudice.
Why It Matters
This order illustrates how the PLRA three-strikes bar operates at the screening stage: the court assembled a seven-strike record from public dockets, resolved the effect of late voluntary-dismissal notices, and applied the imminent-danger exception's plausibility and nexus requirements before dismissing.
The disposition is without prejudice, so the ruling forecloses proceeding IFP on this complaint but does not adjudicate the merits of Van Huisen's underlying allegations; refiling would require payment of the full filing fee.