Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Garland Horton filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California asserting a claim for injunctive relief arising from an alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12010-12213, and a claim for damages under California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51-53. The court observed that it appears to possess only supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any other state-law claim plaintiff may have alleged, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The order does not decide whether the alleged ADA violation occurred or whether Horton is entitled to damages or injunctive relief; it addresses only whether the court should retain the state-law claims.
The court explained that the supplemental-jurisdiction statute reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, citing City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997), and Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). The court then described California's statutory regime addressing "high-frequency litigants" bringing construction-related disability-access claims, which imposes specific pleading requirements and a higher filing fee on litigants meeting certain criteria under Cal. Civ. Code § 55.31(b), Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 425.50 and 425.55, and Cal. Gov't Code § 70616.5. It noted that numerous district courts have found this legislative regime provides "compelling reasons" constituting an "exceptional circumstance" justifying the decline of supplemental jurisdiction over disability state-law claims in certain cases, an approach the Ninth Circuit has upheld multiple times in Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022), and Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202 (9th Cir. 2021).
The Court’s Holding
Judge Dale S. Fischer ordered Horton to show cause in writing why the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any other state-law claim asserted in the complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The response must identify the amount of statutory damages Horton seeks to recover. Horton and his counsel must also support their responses with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the court to determine whether they satisfy the definition of a "high-frequency litigant" under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 425.55(b)(1) and (2).
The response is due no later than November 12, 2026. The court warned that a failure to timely or adequately respond may, without further warning, result in dismissal of the entire action without prejudice, or in the court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act and other state-law claims, if any, and dismissing any such claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The order is a show-cause directive rather than a dismissal: it does not itself dismiss the action, decline jurisdiction, or resolve the merits of the ADA claim.
Key Takeaways
- Horton must show cause in writing why the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any other state-law claims in the complaint.
- His response must identify the amount of statutory damages he seeks to recover.
- Both Horton and his counsel must file declarations signed under penalty of perjury supplying all facts needed to determine whether they meet the high-frequency-litigant definition in Civil Procedure Code section 425.55(b)(1) and (2).
- The response is due by November 12, 2026; an untimely or inadequate response may result in dismissal of the entire action without prejudice or dismissal of the state-law claims after the court declines supplemental jurisdiction.
- The order leaves the supplemental-jurisdiction decision and the merits of the ADA claim unresolved.
Why It Matters
The order places the burden on Horton and his counsel to provide information relevant both to supplemental jurisdiction and to California's high-frequency-litigant framework, connecting that factual inquiry to the court's weighing of whether exceptional circumstances justify declining the state-law claims in a disability-access case, consistent with Ninth Circuit authority.
The immediate consequence is procedural rather than a merits judgment. The ADA claim remains part of the action while the required showing is pending, but the warning makes clear that the entire action could be dismissed without prejudice if the response is untimely or inadequate.