Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Jose Fernando Pineda Perez, a citizen of Honduras, entered the United States in 2021, presented himself to immigration authorities to apply for asylum, and was released on parole that day. The order states that he later obtained work authorization, filed taxes, kept his address updated with USCIS, and became the main provider for three young U.S. citizen children. On August 25, 2026, masked men approached him while he waited in a vehicle outside an AutoZone, questioned him, and arrested him without notice or a warrant. He was transferred to Adelanto, where he remained in custody.
Pineda Perez sought a preliminary injunction after more than two months in custody without an initial custody determination or bond hearing. The government did not contest the petition's factual account, but argued that parole could be revoked without an intensive evidentiary procedure and asserted that he was arrested under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The court also noted an I-213 statement concerning a California conviction, while explaining that the government admitted it was unknown to the arresting agents and was not the basis for parole revocation; Pineda Perez submitted documentation describing a nolo contendere plea to disturbing the peace by loud noise.
The Court’s Holding
Applying the Winter preliminary-injunction standard and the Ninth Circuit's sliding-scale approach, the court found a likelihood of success on multiple grounds. It concluded that the arrest and detention violated statutory and regulatory requirements because no warrant or notice to appear was obtained and no likelihood-of-escape analysis preceded the arrest. Relying on Vazquez v. Bostock, the court held that § 1225(b)(2) did not supply a lawful basis for detaining someone paroled into the country five years earlier; the applicable regime was § 1226. The government's reliance on § 1225 implicitly conceded that Pineda Perez had not received § 1226's required process.
The court rejected the suggestion that Pineda Perez was responsible for the absence of a custody determination because he had not requested one. Without an initial custody determination and Form I-286, he lacked the practical means to request a bond hearing. The court found his detention unlawful from its inception and identified immediate release as the proper remedy. It also found irreparable harm from unlawful detention and from delayed and denied care for a painful abdominal hernia, and held that the merged equities and public-interest factors favored him because the public interest includes procedural protections against unlawful detention.
The injunction ordered Pineda Perez released forthwith from Adelanto under terms no more onerous than those before his August 2026 arrest. It barred re-detention without an immediate pre-deprivation bond hearing, required a compliance statement within two days, and directed placement of the order in his A-file. A footnote stated that the government would bear the burden at such a hearing of proving flight risk or dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. The court did not decide the due-process claim at length because release was granted on other grounds, although it observed that a heightened liberty interest was likely and that the government had forfeited merits arguments by not substantively responding.
Key Takeaways
- The court held that a noncitizen paroled into the United States five years earlier could not lawfully be detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) rather than § 1226.
- The absence of a warrant, notice to appear, pre-arrest escape analysis, initial custody determination, and practical access to a bond-hearing request supported a likelihood of success.
- The government could not blame Pineda Perez for failing to request a bond hearing when it had not provided the custody-determination process through which such requests are ordinarily made.
- The injunction required immediate release and prohibited re-detention without an immediate pre-deprivation bond hearing.
- The court granted release on statutory and procedural grounds without fully resolving the separate due-process claim.
Why It Matters
The order applies Ninth Circuit precedent distinguishing interior detention under § 1226 from detention under § 1225(b)(2), and treats the government's choice of statute as consequential rather than a technical labeling issue. It also explains how omitting an initial custody determination can prevent a detainee from using the ordinary mechanism for requesting a bond hearing.
The relief extends beyond release by regulating any renewed detention and specifying the government's burden at a future bond hearing. The decision is an interim preliminary-injunction ruling in this habeas-related immigration case, not a final adjudication of every claim, and the court expressly left the fuller due-process analysis unnecessary in light of the other grounds for release.