Reported / Citable
Background
In September 2023, Dylan Youngblood was arrested in Kalispell, Montana, on an outstanding felony warrant. Officers found fentanyl pills on his person and two pistols, drug paraphernalia, and suspected methamphetamine in his car. Youngblood admitted one pistol was his and that he had used fentanyl earlier that day. He was indicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(3) for possessing a firearm while being an unlawful user of and addicted to a controlled substance. Youngblood moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing § 922(g)(3) was facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion, concluding the statute’s application to frequent methamphetamine and fentanyl users was consistent with the historical tradition of temporarily disarming intoxicated individuals, and therefore the statute was facially constitutional. Youngblood entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Youngblood’s conviction. The panel held that its prior decision in United States v. Stennerson, 150 F.4th 1276 (9th Cir. 2025), which held § 922(g)(3) facially constitutional because it can be constitutionally applied to presently intoxicated individuals, remains binding precedent after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Hemani, 608 U.S. 772 (2026). The court found Stennerson not clearly irreconcilable with Hemani, which addressed only a narrow as-applied challenge regarding a marijuana user and expressly declined to rule on the statute’s application to presently intoxicated individuals. The panel also held that Youngblood waived his as-applied challenge by failing to specifically and distinctly argue it in his opening brief, offering only a single conclusory sentence without legal analysis or citation to authority.
Key Takeaways
- United States v. Stennerson remains binding Ninth Circuit precedent holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) facially constitutional, as its reasoning is not clearly irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in United States v. Hemani.
- Hemani held § 922(g)(3) unconstitutional as applied to an individual who used marijuana ‘about every other day,’ but expressly declined to address the statute’s application to presently intoxicated individuals or its facial validity.
- A defendant waives an as-applied Second Amendment challenge by failing to argue it specifically and distinctly in the opening brief; a single conclusory sentence without legal development is insufficient.
- The panel applied the two-step Bruen framework: (1) § 922(g)(3) regulates conduct covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text, and (2) the statute is consistent with the historical tradition of temporarily disarming intoxicated persons, at least as applied to frequent users of methamphetamine and fentanyl.
- The district court did not address the ‘addicted to’ prong of § 922(g)(3), and the appellate court did not reach it, affirming solely on the ‘unlawful user’ prong and the facial constitutionality holding.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the facial constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) in the Ninth Circuit post-Bruen and post-Hemani, clarifying that Hemani’s narrow as-applied ruling does not undermine Stennerson’s facial holding. It underscores the circuit’s adherence to the Miller v.
Gammie standard for overruling precedent, requiring clear irreconcilability with intervening Supreme Court authority. The ruling also serves as a procedural warning that as-applied Second Amendment challenges must be fully briefed with specific contentions, reasoning, and citations, or they will be deemed waived. The decision leaves open the constitutionality of § 922(g)(3) as applied to non-intoxicated, habitual drug users—a question Hemani reserved and Youngblood failed to properly present.