Reported / Citable
Background
The People charged Giovanni Garcia with one felony count of driving or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), alleging three prior strike convictions for robbery and a prior prison term. The case was transferred to Department 100, a felony master calendar court presided over by Judge Yvette Verastegui, for trial assignment.
Before assigning the case, Garcia’s counsel requested an indicated sentence. On March 2, 2026, the People filed a timely Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 motion to disqualify Judge Verastegui, which the court clerk rejected with the notation “REJECTED BY COURT 3/2/26.” Judge Verastegui ruled that a section 170.6 challenge could not be brought against a master calendar judge and that providing an indicated sentence did not involve a contested issue of law or fact. Over the People’s objection, the court reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript, probation report, and arguments regarding Garcia’s prior strikes and current offense, exercised its discretion under Penal Code section 1385 to strike the three prior strike convictions, indicated a 16-month sentence, accepted Garcia’s guilty plea, and continued sentencing to allow the People to seek writ review. The People petitioned for a writ of mandate; the Court of Appeal issued a Palma notice and, after the superior court declined to vacate its orders, treated the notice as an order to show cause and heard oral argument.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal granted the petition and issued a peremptory writ of mandate. It held that the People’s section 170.6 motion was timely and in proper form and that Judge Verastegui did not act in her capacity as a master calendar judge when she accepted Garcia’s plea after indicating a sentence that included striking prior strike allegations. The court concluded that the decision to strike prior strikes and the acceptance of a guilty plea involve contested issues of law or fact within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(1). Citing Lorch v. Superior Court (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1266, Lyons v. Superior Court (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 625, Smith v.
Municipal Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 151, and In re Byron B. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 330, the court held that acceptance of a plea pursuant to an indicated sentence is the functional equivalent of a trial for section 170.6 purposes. The distinction between a negotiated plea bargain and an open plea following an indicated sentence is “without a difference.” Fraijo v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 222 and People v. Montalvo (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 790 were distinguished as involving subdivision (a)(2) and rejection of plea bargains. The trial court was required to accept the peremptory challenge and assign the case to a different judge.
Key Takeaways
- A section 170.6 peremptory challenge must be granted if timely and in proper form; the trial court has no discretion to deny it.
- A judge designated as a master calendar judge is not immune from a section 170.6 challenge when the judge acts outside ministerial assignment duties, such as by accepting a guilty plea after indicating a sentence.
- The decision to strike prior strike allegations under Penal Code section 1385 involves contested issues of law or fact, triggering the right to a peremptory challenge under section 170.6, subdivision (a)(1).
- Acceptance of a guilty plea following an indicated sentence is the functional equivalent of a trial for purposes of section 170.6, regardless of whether the plea results from a negotiated bargain or an open plea.
- The People’s section 170.6 motion was timely because it was filed before the court heard any matter involving a contested issue of law or fact—specifically, before the court ruled on striking the strikes and accepted the plea.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies and reinforces the broad scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, subdivision (a)(1) in criminal proceedings. It establishes that a master calendar judge who goes beyond case assignment to evaluate evidence, strike prior convictions, and accept a guilty plea over the prosecution’s objection is subject to a peremptory challenge. The ruling aligns with the legislative intent to liberally construe section 170.6 in favor of allowing disqualification and confirms that the functional equivalent of a trial—including an open plea after an indicated sentence—triggers the right to challenge the judge.
The court expressly declined to address the defendant’s argument that the People’s challenge was made in bad faith under J.O. v. Superior Court (2026) 19 Cal.5th 753, leaving that issue for future resolution.