Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Appellant Ciera Jones and respondent Theresa Uhrig were neighbors living across the street from each other in Santa Monica who engaged in an escalating conflict spanning more than two years following a dispute over care of a cat. Both parties filed cross-petitions for civil harassment restraining orders under California Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. Prior to the consolidated hearing, Uhrig filed supplemental exhibits and declarations detailing ongoing harassment. Both parties appeared in pro. per., testified under oath, and verified their written submissions as direct testimony.
Uhrig presented evidence that Jones engaged in a persistent pattern of harassment, including calling police and animal control on unfounded complaints, placing an anonymous threatening phone call warning Uhrig to stay away from her cats, striking Uhrig's shoulder on a public sidewalk, honking and shouting epithets, conducting persistent close-range video surveillance, and publishing personal information alongside negative reviews and social media posts. The trial court made credibility determinations and granted mutual one-year restraining orders under section 527.6, noting that while some social media posts might raise First Amendment issues, both parties engaged in harassing conduct. Jones appealed the order restraining her, which expired during the pendency of the appeal on December 18, 2025.
The Court’s Holding
The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the restraining order. The court recognized that while an appeal from an expired restraining order is technically moot because no direct relief can be granted, it retained discretion to address the merits because the underlying neighborhood controversy was likely to recur between the parties and the collateral consequences, though speculative, were reasonably possible.
On the merits, the appellate court held that section 527.6 explicitly excludes constitutionally protected activity from the definition of a harassing 'course of conduct.' Because the trial court made no finding that Jones's online posts and reviews were false, those statements remained presumptively protected speech and could not be considered as part of a course of conduct. However, setting the online speech aside entirely, the remaining evidence of unprotected conduct—specifically the true threat via phone, the physical sidewalk shoulder-strike, and persistent close-range surveillance of a private individual—established an independent, qualifying course of conduct supporting the order by clear and convincing evidence.
The court further held that alleged procedural errors at the hearing did not warrant reversal. The trial court did not receive or consider an undisclosed declaration, Jones was not improperly barred from presenting voicemail evidence that was in any event non-prejudicial, and any prejudice from the late service of Uhrig's supplemental filing was cured when the court recessed the proceeding, after which Jones proceeded without renewing an objection or showing that the outcome was impacted.
Key Takeaways
- An appeal from an expired civil harassment restraining order is technically moot, but appellate courts may exercise discretion to reach the merits where an ongoing neighbor dispute makes controversy recurrence likely.
- Alleged defamatory statements cannot be stripped of First Amendment protection or counted toward a harassing course of conduct under section 527.6 absent an explicit judicial finding of falsity.
- A restraining order under section 527.6 will be sustained on appeal if setting aside protected speech leaves an independent residue of unprotected acts—such as true threats, physical battery, and non-consensual surveillance—sufficient to establish a course of conduct.
- Procedural irregularities during an expedited section 527.6 hearing do not require reversal absent a showing of prejudice resulting in a miscarriage of justice under Code of Civil Procedure section 475.
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates the application of Hansen v. Volkov to section 527.6 civil harassment proceedings, confirming that appellate courts must excise presumptively protected speech lacking a finding of falsity before assessing whether the remaining unprotected physical or threatening conduct independently establishes a statutory course of conduct.
It also reinforces that video surveillance of a private citizen does not enjoy the First Amendment protections afforded to newsgathering or recording public officials, qualifying as pure conduct properly enjoinable under California's anti-harassment statutes.