Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Kesler Argon Garcia, a Nicaraguan national, entered the United States without inspection in September 2022 and was apprehended by Border Patrol near Eagle Pass, Texas. According to the order's recitation of the record, he was paroled into the country but never placed in removal proceedings. On June 23, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement took him into custody and transferred him to the California City Detention Facility, where he was served with a Notice to Appear charging him as removable under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Garcia then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Eastern District of California, alleging that his ongoing detention violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The order dates the filing as July 24, 2027, which appears to be a typographical slip given the surrounding 2026 chronology. On August 20, 2026, he received a Notice of Custody Determination and asked an immigration judge to review custody. The next day, Respondents opposed the petition, maintaining that he was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) but was entitled to a custody redetermination hearing under Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, decided by the Ninth Circuit on July 30, 2026.
On September 1, 2026, the court ran a routine search of the EOIR Automated Case Information Database and learned that Garcia had been ordered removed on August 27, 2026. It asked Respondents for the status of any appeal, and on September 29, 2026, they reported that he had not timely appealed.
The Court’s Holding
District Judge Jennifer L. Thurston withdrew the earlier reference to a magistrate judge, citing the interest of justice and judicial efficiency, and disposed of the petition herself. She concluded that because Garcia was ordered removed on August 27, 2026, and filed no appeal within the thirty-day window, the removal order is now final under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.38(b)(2) and 1241.1(c).
On that basis, the court held that Garcia's detention is now governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2), which requires detention during the ninety-day removal period. Relying on Baires v. Lynch and other district court decisions, it reasoned that a petition challenging detention under section 1226 is rendered moot when detention authority shifts to section 1231. The court therefore expressly declined to decide whether the initial detention was governed by § 1226(a) or whether it violated due process.
The operative disposition is that the petition is denied as moot, although the caption and introduction describe it as dismissed as moot. The order does not rule on the merits, grants no relief, gives no leave to amend, and directs the clerk to close the case. It also does not address whether detention under § 1231 is lawful in any respect, such as its length.
Key Takeaways
- A change in the statutory source of detention authority can moot a pending habeas petition, here because an unappealed removal order became final and shifted detention from section 1226 to section 1231.
- The court did not decide whether Garcia's earlier detention violated due process, so the order contains no ruling on that claim or on the Respondents' § 1225(b)(2)(A) position.
- Because Garcia did not appeal the immigration judge's removal order within thirty days, the order became final under the regulations the court cited.
- The disposition is a mootness ruling rather than a merits denial, and the order includes no express leave to amend and no ruling on any challenge to detention under § 1231.
Why It Matters
This is a short district court order in a case with no reported citation, so it carries no binding precedential weight. Its reasoning rests on regulatory finality and on non-binding district court decisions, including a prior order from the same judge. It shows how events in removal proceedings can end a federal habeas case while it is pending.
The order is most useful as an example of procedure. A court may check public immigration court records, ask the government for an update, and resolve the petition on mootness grounds without reaching constitutional questions. Because the court did not analyze the Rodriguez Vazquez custody-hearing issue or the legality of detention under § 1231, practitioners should not read the order as resolving either question.