Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Yosbel Abin-Diaz, a federal immigration detainee represented by counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Eastern District of California against the Warden of the Central Valley Annex. As described in the findings, the petition alleges that his post-removal detention is indefinite and violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Those are the petitioner's allegations; the findings do not evaluate their merit.
Petitioner has a second immigration habeas action pending in the same district, Abin-Diaz v. Warden, Central Valley Annex, No. 1:26-cv-07300 (called Abin-Diaz II), which was filed later than this case. On September 16, 2026, District Judge Drozd issued an order relating the two cases. The same day, the Respondent moved to dismiss this action so that Abin-Diaz II could proceed, arguing that the cases involve the same parties and issues and that the later-filed case was further along toward resolution. The motion was before Magistrate Judge Sean C. Riordan under Local Rule 302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). His findings and recommendations are dated October 9, 2026, and were entered on October 13, 2026.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge recommends that the Respondent's motion to dismiss be granted. He began with the court's broad discretion to control its own docket, including the power to dismiss duplicative claims. Citing Adams v. California Department of Health Services and M.M. v. Lafayette School District, the findings explain that, after weighing the equities, a court may dismiss a duplicative later-filed action, stay it, enjoin the parties from proceeding with it, or consolidate the actions. Plaintiffs generally have no right to maintain two actions on the same subject against the same defendant in the same court at the same time.
To decide whether the second action is duplicative, the findings ask whether the causes of action and relief sought, and the parties or their privies, are the same. The magistrate judge found that both petitions challenge the petitioner's allegedly indefinite post-removal detention under the Due Process Clause and Zadvydas, and that the respondent in both is the Warden of the Central Valley Annex, so both requirements are met.
The findings also address Woods v. Carey, which generally treats a new petition filed before an earlier one is finally decided as a motion to amend the pending petition rather than as a successive application. Because Abin-Diaz II is fully briefed and significantly further along, construing it as a motion to amend would serve no purpose. The recommended disposition is to dismiss the petition in this case without prejudice as duplicative of Abin-Diaz II and to deny the petitioner's motion to appoint counsel as moot. The findings go to District Judge Drozd; any party may file objections within fourteen days of service, and failure to do so may waive the right to appeal the district court's order.
Key Takeaways
- The document is a magistrate judge's recommendation, not a final order; the dismissal takes effect only if the assigned district judge adopts it.
- Duplicative-action analysis turns on whether the causes of action, requested relief, and parties or privies are the same, not on which case was filed first.
- Here the earlier-filed case was recommended for dismissal because the later-filed case was fully briefed and further along, so filing order did not control.
- The recommended dismissal is without prejudice, and the findings do not decide whether the Zadvydas detention claim has merit; that question remains open in Abin-Diaz II.
- The request for appointed counsel in this case would be denied as moot, while the findings leave any counsel issue in the other case unaddressed.
Why It Matters
The findings illustrate how federal district courts manage parallel immigration habeas petitions by the same detainee against the same custodian. Rather than mechanically preferring the first-filed case or converting the later petition into an amendment, the magistrate judge chose the vehicle that was already fully briefed, in the interest of judicial economy.
The decision has limited precedential weight. It is a magistrate judge's proposed disposition in a district court, it applies existing Ninth Circuit duplicative-litigation principles rather than announcing new law, and it is not binding on other courts. Its practical effect is narrow: if adopted, the petitioner's detention challenge proceeds only in Abin-Diaz II, and nothing in the findings resolves the underlying claim. The findings also do not explain the status of the other docket beyond being fully briefed, so readers should check later orders for the district judge's ruling on objections.