Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Anderson Jhoan R.P. entered the United States on or around April 29, 2024, was issued a Notice to Appear after encountering U.S. Border Patrol, and was released with his family. He was later granted a work permit and Social Security number. On June 27, 2026, he was arrested for a liquor violation and possession of marijuana under two ounces, and on July 10, 2026, convicted of marijuana possession. He was transferred to ICE custody on July 12, 2026, and detained at the Bluebonnet Detention Facility in Texas without ever receiving a bond hearing. On August 4, 2026, he filed a habeas petition in the Northern District of Texas, which remained pending, before being transferred to the California City Immigration Processing Center.
On September 28, 2026, Petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a motion for a temporary restraining order in the Eastern District of California, challenging the lawfulness of his civil immigration detention and seeking immediate release or, in the alternative, a bond hearing. Respondents filed a consolidated motion to dismiss, answer, and opposition to the TRO, arguing for dismissal under the first-to-file rule in favor of the Texas case, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies through a Joseph hearing, and for mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A) based on his marijuana conviction.
The Court’s Holding
The court rejected the first-to-file argument, finding that comity, consistency, and judicial economy would not be served by declining jurisdiction because the Texas court had entered no substantive orders, the matter was fully briefed, and a substantial liberty interest was at stake. It also declined to require prudential exhaustion, reasoning that no administrative record was needed, a Joseph hearing would be futile where the Notice to Appear charged no criminal ground, and delay would cause irreparable injury.
On the merits, the court held that mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(A) requires an administrative charge of inadmissibility for a covered offense as a prerequisite. Petitioner's Notice to Appear charged only inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) for lacking valid entry documents; it never referenced § 1182(a)(2) or his criminal convictions, and no amended notice was issued. Because § 1226(c) therefore did not govern, the court determined that Petitioner's detention was governed by the discretionary provision, § 1226(a), which carries procedural safeguards including an initial custody determination and a bond hearing.
Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge factors, the court found that Petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his continued freedom arising from his 2024 release, that the risk of erroneous deprivation was considerable given that he received no notice, initial custody determination, or bond hearing during over three months of detention, and that the government's burden in providing routine notice and hearings was minimal. The court concluded that the detention violated the Fifth Amendment. It granted the petition, ordered Petitioner's immediate release with return of his documents and possessions, enjoined re-detention absent seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation hearing at which the government must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence, denied the motion to dismiss, denied the TRO as moot, and directed entry of judgment and case closure.
Key Takeaways
- Mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A) requires the government to charge the noncitizen with inadmissibility for a covered criminal offense in the Notice to Appear; a conviction alone is not enough.
- A noncitizen detained without a covered charge falls under § 1226(a) and is entitled to its procedural protections, including an initial custody determination and a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.
- Release into the community pending removal proceedings creates a Fifth Amendment liberty interest, and detention for over three months without notice or any hearing violates procedural due process under Mathews.
- The first-to-file rule is not mechanically applied; a court may proceed where the earlier-filed case has produced no substantive orders and a substantial liberty interest favors prompt resolution.
- Prudential exhaustion through a Joseph hearing is excused where futile and where delay would cause irreparable injury to a significant liberty interest.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces a line of Eastern District of California authority holding that the government cannot invoke 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) as a post hoc justification for detention without a hearing when the Notice to Appear never charged a covered criminal offense. Charging documents serve a constitutional notice function, and detaining someone without such notice raises serious due process concerns.
The order's forward-looking injunction is notable: it bars re-detention absent seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation hearing at which the government must show by clear and convincing evidence either a proper mandatory-detention charge or that no alternative to detention can mitigate flight or safety risks, with counsel permitted.