Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Jackel Cinelus, a citizen and native of Haiti, entered the United States on August 6, 2024, received a Form I-94, and was paroled until April 24, 2026. Removal proceedings were initiated against him, with a master calendar hearing scheduled in Miami for November 3, 2026, and he held employment authorization valid through September 10, 2027. ICE officers arrested him on September 4, 2026, in National City while he was working as an Uber Eats delivery driver, and he was detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center.
Cinelus filed a combined habeas petition and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on October 17, 2026. He alleged that officials gave no prior notice explaining his detention, no opportunity to be heard, and no individualized re-detention determination. He principally claimed a due-process violation, also invoked the Administrative Procedure Act, and sought immediate release. Respondents contended that he was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and that Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock did not apply. They nevertheless acknowledged that the court's prior decisions would control if adhered to, admitted lacking information about termination of his parole under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2), did not oppose the petition, and deferred to the court on relief.
The Court’s Holding
The court assumed without deciding that § 1225(b)(2)'s mandatory-detention procedures governed. It explained that this would not establish lawful parole termination or constitutionally adequate process before revocation of previously granted liberty, and respondents had not attempted to show an individualized determination before re-detention. The court construed their non-opposition to immediate release as a concession that the detention violated due process. Relying on Noori v. LaRose, it found Cinelus received even less process than the petitioner there: no notification or individualized reason preceded his summary detention, and respondents still had not explained changed circumstances. A bond hearing could not remedy the completed Fifth Amendment violation; only release could.
The court also rejected the implied theory that parole's expiration eliminated due-process protection, explaining that a private liberty interest does not expire with parole and that expiration does not obviate an individualized hearing before detention. It granted the petition in part and ordered release within 24 hours under the conditions existing immediately before the September 4 detention. Respondents were barred from re-detaining Cinelus unless clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker established flight risk or community danger justifying custody. They also could not place him in Alternatives to Detention or use an ankle monitor upon release. The APA claim remained unaddressed, and fees and costs were denied without prejudice with leave to apply within 30 days after judgment.
Key Takeaways
- Mandatory-detention authority under § 1225(b)(2), even if applicable, does not answer whether parole was lawfully terminated or whether constitutionally adequate process preceded re-detention.
- The court treated respondents' failure to oppose immediate release as a concession that Cinelus's detention violated his due-process rights.
- Because no notice or individualized reason preceded the arrest, the court concluded that a later bond hearing could not cure the Fifth Amendment violation and that release was necessary.
- Expiration of parole did not extinguish Cinelus's liberty interest or eliminate the need for an individualized hearing before detention.
- Any future re-detention requires clear and convincing evidence of flight risk or danger at a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and the order separately prohibits Alternatives to Detention and ankle monitoring upon release.
Why It Matters
The decision applies this district's Noori reasoning to a parolee who received no revocation notice at all, distinguishing lawful custody authority from the process required before the government revokes previously granted liberty. Its remedy goes beyond ordering a bond hearing: it requires prompt restoration of the prior conditions of release and imposes specific safeguards against renewed detention and supervision measures.
The ruling is expressly limited in several respects. The court did not decide whether § 1225(b)(2) actually governed, did not reach the APA claim, and left reasonable fees and costs open through a timely post-judgment application. The Clerk was directed to enter judgment and close the case on November 12, 2026, unless Cinelus reported noncompliance with the order.