California Case Summaries

Tran Thtuy Le and Tory Le v. The Turnkey Foundation Inc., et al. — Court Grants Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application and Extends Arbor Service Deadline to November 9, 2026 Despite Finding No Good Cause

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Tran Thtuy Le and Tory Le v. The Turnkey Foundation Inc., et al.
Court
U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
Judge
Janis L. Sammartino (George W. Bush, 2007)
Date Decided
2026-10-27
Docket No.
3:26-cv-01570
Status
Unreported
Topics
service of process, Rule 4(m), extension of time, good cause, discretion, ex parte application

Background

Plaintiffs Tran Thtuy Le and Tory Le filed this action against The Turnkey Foundation Inc., doing business as Arbor Financial Group, and other defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, Case No. 3:26-cv-01570-JLS-VET. After removal from state court, Plaintiffs attempted to serve Arbor with a state court summons. Arbor responded by moving to dismiss or, in the alternative, to quash the summons at ECF No. 11. The court granted that motion in part at ECF No. 17 and, in its September 25, 2026 order, ordered Plaintiffs to serve Arbor within thirty days.

Plaintiffs then engaged a registered process server to serve the summons and Second Amended Complaint at the address Arbor had identified in its motion to dismiss. They also asked Arbor's counsel to accept service by email, but Arbor's counsel did not respond. Before the thirty-day deadline expired, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application at ECF No. 22 asking the court for a fourteen-day extension of the service deadline set by the September 25, 2026 order.

The Court’s Holding

The court granted the application, but expressly declined to find good cause. It explained that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) sets an 'irreducible allowance' of ninety days for a plaintiff to complete service, citing Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 661 (1996). If service is not completed within that time, the rule requires a district court to grant an extension when the plaintiff shows good cause and permits an extension even in the absence of good cause, citing Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). In exercising that discretion, courts may consider factors such as a statute of limitations bar, prejudice to the defendant, actual notice of the lawsuit, and eventual service, quoting Troxell v. Fedders of North America, Inc., 160 F.3d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 1998).

Applying that framework, the court found no good cause based on counsel's single email to Arbor's counsel and incomplete service through a registered process server. Nevertheless, the court exercised its discretion to grant an extension because Arbor was aware of the claims against it, as shown by its own motion to dismiss at ECF No. 11, and because the court saw no reason why Defendants would be prejudiced by a short additional delay.

The operative directive is that the court GRANTS the application and orders Plaintiffs to serve Defendant Arbor in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 on or before November 9, 2026. The order also reminds the parties of this District's Code of Conduct under Civil Local Rule 2.1(a), particularly the duty not to arbitrarily or unreasonably withhold consent to a reasonable request for cooperation or accommodation under Civil Local Rule 2.1(a)(3)(d).

Key Takeaways

  • Rule 4(m) distinguishes between mandatory extensions, which are required when the plaintiff shows good cause, and discretionary extensions, which the court may grant even without good cause.
  • The court found no good cause where plaintiffs' counsel sent a single email to defense counsel and attempted service through a registered process server but did not complete service.
  • Despite finding no good cause, the court granted the extension because Arbor had actual notice of the claims and would not be prejudiced by a short additional delay.
  • The operative deadline is service on Arbor under Rule 4 on or before November 9, 2026, and the order separately reminds counsel of the local duty not to arbitrarily or unreasonably withhold consent to reasonable requests for cooperation or accommodation.

Why It Matters

The ruling illustrates how a district court can reject the good-cause rationale yet still grant relief under Rule 4(m)'s discretionary branch when the defendant has actual notice of the lawsuit and no cognizable prejudice from a short extension. It confirms that the order is limited to the service deadline for Arbor and does not resolve the merits of the claims or the status of the other defendants. For practitioners, it is a reminder that even a weak showing on good cause may still support an extension where the defendant is already before the court and aware of the claims.

The decision also underscores the court's expectation of professional cooperation between counsel: after granting the extension, it reminded the parties of Civil Local Rule 2.1(a)(3)(d), which addresses arbitrarily or unreasonably withholding consent to reasonable requests for cooperation or accommodation.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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