Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
A jury convicted Jonathan Robert Camp of first degree murder with a deadly-weapon finding and attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime. On July 2, 2023, Camp was staying with his father and his father's roommate, John. After tensions developed, Camp entered his father's bedroom holding two knives and threatened to kill John. Later that night he stabbed John 17 times, including 11 times in the chest.
When Camp's father initiated a 911 call at 11:24 p.m., Camp slapped the cell phone out of his hand before any substantive information could be conveyed, asked "Why you doing that?", and left the apartment at 11:28 p.m. Father later found a different phone and called 911 at 11:54 p.m. At approximately 4:00 a.m., Camp approached a police officer outside the building and turned himself in; he had a wallet containing $89.
At trial, Camp did not deny killing John but claimed he had invited John to participate in a knife fight. On the witness dissuasion count, the defense argued that Camp's voluntary intoxication prevented him from forming the specific intent the offense requires; his blood alcohol level was .268 percent at 8:52 a.m. the next morning. The jury convicted Camp on both counts, and the trial court sentenced him to 26 years to life, including a concurrent two-year determinate term for count 2, and imposed a $25,000 restitution fine and a matching parole revocation restitution fine, stayed unless parole was revoked.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal rejected Camp's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for attempting to dissuade a witness. Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1), is a specific intent crime: the prosecution must prove the defendant specifically intended his acts would prevent or dissuade a victim or witness from reporting a crime to authorities. Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible on that intent question, but the verdict will not be disturbed if substantial evidence supports the implied finding that the defendant formed the required specific intent.
Camp's conduct supported the intent finding: he knocked the phone away while asking why his father was calling, then left four minutes later before police could respond. His father told the 911 dispatcher Camp was angry rather than drunk, but later gave conflicting testimony. The jury could decide which account to credit. Video of Camp leaving did not show obvious extreme intoxication. His departure supported an inference that he sought to avoid police contact after the killing. The next morning's .268 percent blood alcohol reading did not compel a different result: Camp had been away for four and a half hours with money, leaving open the possibility of intervening drinking.
The court agreed with both parties that the trial court erred in imposing $25,000 fines. Section 1202.4, subdivision (b), caps a felony restitution fine at $10,000, and section 1202.45, subdivision (a), requires the parole revocation restitution fine to match the restitution fine. The court modified the judgment to reduce each fine to $10,000, directed the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and affirmed the judgment as modified.
Key Takeaways
- Voluntary intoxication does not automatically negate the specific intent required for attempting to dissuade a witness under Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1); the jury decides whether the defendant was too intoxicated to form that intent.
- Conflicting witness testimony about a defendant's intoxication is for the jury to resolve, and appellate courts will not disturb credibility determinations supported by substantial evidence.
- A defendant's prompt departure from the scene after a witness attempts to call police can support an inference that he acted to avoid contact with the police.
- Blood alcohol evidence taken hours after an offense may be treated as not probative of intoxication at the time of the offense where the defendant was away with money and could have consumed alcohol in the interim.
- Trial courts exceed their statutory authority by imposing restitution fines above the $10,000 maximum in section 1202.4, subdivision (b), and appellate courts may correct the error by modification without remanding.
Why It Matters
In this record, contemporaneous statements, video and Camp's conduct supported specific intent despite evidence of drinking. Possible intervening alcohol consumption also allowed the jury to discount the later blood-alcohol reading. Separately, the statutory maximum required reduction of both fines to $10,000. The amended-abstract directive implemented those corrections while the judgment otherwise remained affirmed.