Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Charles E. Willis was a convicted sex offender subject to lifetime registration. From 2016 to May 2023, he registered a Lakeside address as his residence. He registered as a transient in May 2023 and continued identifying himself as transient in August and September 2024. During that period, however, he was seen at the Lakeside address, and a police search found a package addressed to him in the kitchen, medications bearing his name, and mail addressed to him there.
In count 1, the prosecution alleged that between January 1 and October 1, 2024, Willis had more than one residence address and failed to register all addresses and locations at which he regularly resided, violating Penal Code sections 290.010 and 290.018, subdivision (b). A jury convicted him of that offense and, in count 2, of failing to provide required information or providing false information on registration forms under section 290.018, subdivision (k). The trial court imposed the middle term of four years in prison on count 1 and three days in jail, with credit for time served, on count 2.
Willis argued on appeal that insufficient evidence supported the multiple-residence conviction. He also argued that the trial court prejudicially erred by not instructing the jury that conviction required findings that he had more than one residence address at which he regularly resided when registering and failed to report those residences. The People properly conceded both claims.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal agreed that the evidence was insufficient on count 1 and reversed that conviction. Section 290.010 requires a person who regularly resides at more than one residence to register in each jurisdiction where those residences are located, regardless of how many days or nights the person spends at each address. The evidence showed that Willis registered as a transient in San Diego County throughout the charged period but also regularly resided at the Lakeside address. The parties agreed, and the court concurred, that this did not establish more than one residence within the meaning of section 290.010.
The statutory definitions controlled the result. The Sex Offender Registration Act defines a transient as a person who has no residence, while a residence means one or more addresses at which a person regularly resides, regardless of the number of days or nights spent there. Willis's transient registration therefore was not one residence in addition to the Lakeside address. Once he regularly resided at Lakeside, he no longer qualified as a transient because he had a residence. His failure to register that address as a residence did not prove that he had, or failed to register, multiple residences as count 1 alleged.
The court observed that the evidence instead suggested a violation of section 290.011, which requires a transient who moves to a residence to register that address within five working days. But treating the prosecution's choice of section 290.010 as harmless would deprive Willis of notice that he was charged under section 290.011 and of an opportunity to prepare or present a defense to that offense. The People conceded the error was not harmless, and the court agreed. Because insufficiency of the evidence resolved count 1, the court did not address Willis's instructional-error claim.
Key Takeaways
- A transient registration is not itself a residence that can be combined with a physical address to prove multiple residences under Penal Code section 290.010.
- Evidence that Willis regularly resided at the Lakeside address meant he no longer met the statutory definition of a transient, rather than proving he had two residences.
- The court reversed count 1 for insufficient evidence and accepted the parties' position that charging section 290.010 instead of section 290.011 was not harmless.
- Willis had no notice of a section 290.011 charge and no opportunity to prepare or present a defense to that different offense.
- The judgment was affirmed in all other respects, the cause was remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion, and the instructional-error claim was left unaddressed.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes failing to update a transient registration after acquiring a residence from the separate offense of failing to register multiple residences. Regularly residing at one identified address does not turn an earlier or continuing transient designation into an additional residence for purposes of section 290.010.
The partial reversal also rests on notice and the ability to defend against the offense actually charged. Although the opinion identifies evidence suggesting a possible section 290.011 violation, it does not convict Willis of that offense. Count 2 and the remainder of the judgment were affirmed, and the appellate court expressly declined to reach the jury-instruction issue after resolving count 1 on evidentiary grounds.