Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Joseph F. Farivar Investment Group, Inc. owns property at 4335 Valley Boulevard in Los Angeles, which Bordan Shoe Company, Inc. leases. The property lies downgradient from 1919 Vineburn Avenue, currently owned by HPC Vineburn, LLC and previously owned by Meruelo Maddux Properties-1919 Vineburn Street, LLC. Before these defendants, Nardon Manufacturing Company operated a metal fabrication facility on the Vineburn Property and discharged waste including 1,4-dioxane. In 2020, a consultant report prepared for Vineburn showed that soil and groundwater contamination had migrated from the Vineburn Property onto the Farivar Property.
Plaintiffs sued alleging continuing nuisance, continuing trespass, negligence, negligence per se, and declaratory relief. They moved for summary adjudication, relying on the 2020 report and expert declarations estimating $11,779,000 in remediation costs over 20 years plus $192,887 in lost use. Vineburn opposed, arguing causation was disputed because the Farivar Property itself contributed to contamination and citing its expert's $5 million cleanup estimate; Maddux filed no opposition. The trial court granted summary adjudication on all claims and entered judgment for $12,245,108.42, including $273,221.42 in prejudgment interest, declaring defendants responsible for the 1,4-dioxane contamination.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the trial court erred in summarily adjudicating each cause of action. On negligence, although landowners owe a common law duty to act reasonably toward adjacent property owners, triable issues of fact existed as to breach. Vineburn learned of the migration in May 2020 and proposed a cleanup plan before January 2022, but the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board ordered additional investigation in September 2023; a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the delay was not unreasonable. As to Maddux, plaintiffs presented no evidence it knew of the contamination during its 2005–2013 ownership. The court also rejected plaintiffs' statutory negligence per se theories under Civil Code sections 1714, 3479, and 3483, Government Code section 66600, Water Code section 13350, and Health and Safety Code sections 5411 and 25249.5.
The court further held that summary adjudication of the continuing nuisance and continuing trespass claims was error because plaintiffs used an improper damages measure: for continuing torts, recovery is limited to actual injury suffered before suit, and prospective damages are unavailable. Plaintiffs' experts instead valued 20 years of future remediation costs and rental losses. Finally, the partial summary adjudication of declaratory relief violated Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1), which requires summary adjudication to completely dispose of a cause of action; the judgment declared defendants responsible only for 1,4-dioxane and did not address other chemicals or remediation obligations alleged in the complaint.
Key Takeaways
- A landowner's duty to act reasonably toward adjacent owners does not establish breach as a matter of law when the owner proposes remediation and regulators request further investigation.
- For continuing nuisance and continuing trespass, damages are limited to injury suffered before filing suit; prospective damages cannot support summary adjudication.
- Summary adjudication of declaratory relief must completely dispose of the cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1).
- Negligence per se requires a statute prescribing specific conduct; nuisance statutes do not supply the standard of care.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces limits on summary adjudication in environmental contamination cases. Even where contamination migration is undisputed, questions of breach, causation, and the proper damages measure typically present triable issues of fact. The ruling also confirms that declaratory relief cannot circumvent the requirement that summary adjudication completely dispose of a cause of action.
The opinion clarifies that the duty of reasonable care between adjacent landowners does not impose strict liability, and that successor owners who lacked knowledge of contamination during their ownership cannot be held negligent as a matter of law.