Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Anansa So's former tenants obtained a $149,705.62 judgment against her in 2011 for breach of lease and fraud. In December 2017, Richard Guido, one of the tenants, assigned the judgment to the Mark Schulman 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan—Roth Account, representing he had acquired Delport's rights and was assigning all his rights to the Plan. The Plan filed an affidavit of identity in April 2018 and an application for and renewal of the judgment in October 2018, representing the judgment amount had increased to about $258,000 due to post-judgment costs and accrued interest.
Sometime in 2018, So's bank notified her that the sheriff had taken $28,000 from her account and a Cartier watch from her safe deposit box. She learned that Schulman, as the judgment's assignee, was responsible for the alleged confiscation of her assets. The Plan filed a proof of service stating the renewal document was mailed to So at an address in Long Beach, but So alleged she did not live at that address.
On January 21, 2025, So sued the Plan and Mark Schulman, alleging the assignment was void and that defendants sent documents to an incorrect address to surreptitiously take her property. She asserted claims for abuse of process, wrongful attachment, violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, conversion, unjust enrichment, unfair competition, intentional infliction of emotional distress, declaratory relief, constructive trust, accounting, and injunctive relief. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint, arguing the claims arose from protected judgment enforcement activities and lacked minimal merit. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion and entered judgment of dismissal. So appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of dismissal, applying the two-step anti-SLAPP analysis. At step one, the court held that defendants' alleged wrongdoing in connection with the assignment and renewals of the judgment, levies, and related notices were protected litigation-related activities central to each claim. The court rejected So's attempt to characterize the conduct as an unalleged conspiracy or unprotected conversion, explaining that the issues in an anti-SLAPP motion are framed by the pleadings and that So's claims were based on the use of court processes to enforce a judgment.
The court also rejected So's argument that defendants' conduct was illegal and therefore unprotected under the narrow exception described in Flatley v. Mauro. The court explained that the exception applies only when the moving defendant concedes, or the evidence conclusively establishes, that the assertedly protected speech or petitioning activity was illegal as a matter of law, and that the plaintiff must prove criminal, not merely illegal, conduct by the defendant. Here, defendants did not concede any crime, and the existence of judgments, orders, or complaints against defendants and Guido in unrelated cases did not conclusively prove any crime was committed.
At step two, the court agreed that So's claims lacked minimal merit. The Debt Collection Act claim was time-barred because January 7, 2024, the date So claimed to have become aware of the alleged fraud, was more than one year before she filed the complaint on January 21, 2025. The remaining claims were barred by the litigation privilege, which extends to acts necessary to enforce a judgment, including applying for writ of execution and levying.
Key Takeaways
- Judgment enforcement activities, including obtaining and renewing judgments, applying for writs of execution, and levying on assets, are protected litigation-related activities under California's anti-SLAPP statute.
- The narrow Flatley exception to anti-SLAPP protection requires the plaintiff to prove criminal, not merely illegal, conduct by the defendant, and the existence of judgments, orders, or complaints in unrelated cases does not conclusively prove any crime was committed.
- A plaintiff cannot avoid the anti-SLAPP statute by asserting her case involves an unalleged conspiracy; the issues in an anti-SLAPP motion are framed by the pleadings.
- The litigation privilege bars all tort theories of recovery except malicious prosecution and extends to acts necessary to enforce a judgment, including applying for writ of execution and levying.
- The one-year statute of limitations for Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims runs from the date of the occurrence of the violation, and a claim filed more than one year after that date is time-barred.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that judgment creditors and their assignees can use the anti-SLAPP statute to strike claims challenging their enforcement activities, and that judgment debtors cannot circumvent the statute by characterizing the conduct as conversion or conspiracy when the claims are actually based on the use of court processes.
The opinion also clarifies that the litigation privilege provides a complete defense to claims arising from judgment enforcement activities, and that trial courts need not address each claim individually when the same reasoning applies to all claims.