Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Jeff Fisher sued his sister, Jennifer Fisher, for defamation in March 2025 after she submitted a written declaration supporting his ex-wife in a domestic violence and child custody proceeding. Jennifer filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint and sought attorney’s fees and costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. On May 28, 2025, the trial court granted the motion to strike the complaint in its entirety and ordered Jeff to pay Jennifer $4,200 in attorney’s fees within 30 days. Jeff did not appeal that order.
After Jeff did not pay, the court issued an order to show cause concerning contempt and Jennifer’s request for an additional $1,800 in fees. At the December 17, 2025 hearing, the court found insufficient willful disobedience for contempt, vacated the order to show cause, and declined the additional fee request. It nevertheless found that Jeff appeared to have assets outside his exempt income sufficient to pay the original award and again ordered payment within 30 days. Jeff then sought relief from the fee order, asserting exemptions for his VA disability compensation, Social Security benefits, and other property.
Jennifer characterized the motion as an improper reconsideration request and asked for sanctions under section 1008, subdivision (d), stating that her attorney had incurred $1,800 responding to it. On February 4, 2026, the trial court denied relief, explaining that a judgment debtor generally cannot claim an exemption before a levy. It alternatively concluded that, if treated as a reconsideration motion, the request failed to present new or different facts or law, changed circumstances, or a satisfactory explanation for not raising the arguments earlier. The court also imposed $1,800 in monetary sanctions, and Jeff timely appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal rejected Jeff’s argument that his motion was not subject to reconsideration requirements merely because exemption claims ordinarily defend against collection. Several arguments expressly challenged the December 17 order and its findings, including the finding of nonexempt assets and the opportunity to assert exemptions. The court also found that the cited portions of Jeff’s reply brief did not support his claim that he had explained to the trial court why the arguments could not have been raised earlier. His statements about needing time to investigate asset values and exemptions did not establish a basis for reconsideration, so denying the motion as a reconsideration request was not an abuse of discretion.
The court reached a different result on sanctions. Section 1008, subdivision (d), permits sanctions as allowed by section 128.7, and the appellate court explained that section 128.7’s procedural requirements therefore apply. The trial court had not issued an order to show cause, and Jennifer’s request in an opposition brief did not satisfy the required two-step process: service of a sanctions motion, followed by a 21-day opportunity to withdraw the challenged filing before the motion may be filed. Failure to comply with those safe harbor requirements precludes sanctions and requires reversal, notwithstanding the ordinarily deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.
The court also upheld the conclusion that Jeff’s exemption claims were premature. It cited statutes applying exemptions to enforcement procedures and providing for claims concerning property that has been levied upon. Jeff had not demonstrated error in the prematurity ruling or a basis for revisiting the December 17 finding that he appeared to have sufficient nonexempt assets. The court therefore affirmed the February 4, 2026 order except for the sanctions award, reversed the $1,800 sanctions portion, and directed the parties to bear their own costs on appeal.
Key Takeaways
- A request framed as relief from an attorney’s fees order may be evaluated under reconsideration standards when its arguments substantively challenge an earlier order and its findings.
- A party seeking reconsideration must provide the trial court with a satisfactory explanation for failing to present the new or different information earlier.
- Monetary sanctions sought under section 1008, subdivision (d), remain subject to section 128.7’s procedural safeguards.
- Requesting sanctions in an opposition brief does not substitute for serving a separate sanctions motion and observing the 21-day safe harbor period.
- The appellate court did not decide whether Jeff’s home equity was fully protected by the homestead exemption because it affirmed the prematurity and reconsideration rulings.
Why It Matters
The decision separates the validity of an underlying fee-enforcement ruling from the procedural validity of sanctions imposed in the same order. Although the trial court could deny Jeff’s motion as premature and, alternatively, as an unjustified reconsideration request, the sanctions could not stand without compliance with section 128.7. The opinion emphasizes that the safe harbor procedure is mandatory rather than a technicality that can be overlooked under deferential appellate review.
The ruling also leaves the substantive exemption disputes unresolved. The court did not determine the extent of protection for Jeff’s VA benefits, Social Security income, or home equity; it held that he had not shown error in the trial court’s conclusion that his claims were premature and had not established grounds to revisit the prior order.