Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Matthew V. Herron filed a petition for writ of mandate against the San Diego Unified Port District, seeking to force closure of the Feast and Fareway restaurant at the Coronado Municipal Golf Course. He alleged the Port District breached its duty to manage public tidelands by allowing the restaurant in violation of the lease between the Port District and the City of Coronado. The City leases the Golf Course under a 1997 lease limiting use to a public golf course, including a snack bar with alcoholic beverages, and prohibiting any hotel, motel, restaurant, or cocktail lounge.
In 2018, the City contracted with Feast and Fareway, LLC to provide food and beverage services at the Golf Course. Herron's late wife previously challenged the concession agreement in a separate action as violating the lease and the public trust; summary judgment for the City was affirmed on appeal. In the present case, Herron alleged the Port District breached the public trust by refusing to act against the City, and asked the trial court to order the City to cease the prohibited operations or pay market rent.
The Port District demurred, arguing Herron lacked standing to enforce a lease to which he was not a party, that his request was for traditional mandamus, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to direct the Port District's discretion over public trust lands. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding Herron sought traditional mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 based on the Public Trust Doctrine, which involves discretionary agency decisions, and that he failed to identify any ministerial duty the Port District failed to perform.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of dismissal, holding that the trial court correctly determined courts lack jurisdiction to interfere with the Port District's broad discretion over management of public tidelands. Relying on its recent decision in Herron v. San Diego Unified Port District (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1, the court explained that Herron could not establish a claim for traditional mandamus based on the Port District's discretionary leasing decisions, which it may make for purposes that do not interfere with commerce or navigation.
The court rejected Herron's contention that the Port District breached a ministerial duty by failing to enforce the lease provision precluding a restaurant. The same lease allows a snack bar with alcoholic beverages, and evaluating whether the City violated the lease by allowing a restaurant rather than a snack bar, and whether to enforce that claim, are discretionary decisions for the Port District. Lease terms are an agreement between the parties and do not establish whether a given use serves the public trust.
The court held Herron has no standing to enforce a lease to which he is neither a party nor a direct beneficiary, and distinguished his cited cases, which involved actual harm to trust lands or administrative challenges. Herron made no claim that the tidelands are being harmed or that the Port District failed to consider its public trust duty. He therefore failed to establish that subleasing tidelands for a food-and-beverage establishment violates the public trust or that the Port District violated the trust by not enforcing a single lease term.
Key Takeaways
- Courts lack jurisdiction to interfere with a public agency's discretionary management of public trust lands absent a breached ministerial duty.
- A private citizen cannot use traditional mandamus to enforce a third-party lease to which the citizen is neither a party nor a direct beneficiary.
- Whether a lease violation occurred and whether to enforce lease terms are discretionary agency decisions, not ministerial duties subject to judicial compulsion.
- Subleasing public tidelands for a commercial food-and-beverage establishment does not itself violate the public trust absent harm to trust resources.
- Public agencies have no special duty to carry out contract terms, so no ministerial duty arises to be enforced through mandamus.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the broad discretion public agencies hold in managing public trust lands and the limited judicial role in reviewing those decisions. It confirms that the public trust doctrine does not convert lease provisions into ministerial duties enforceable by private citizens through mandamus, and that courts will abstain absent a clear nondiscretionary duty or actual harm to trust resources. The ruling also underscores standing limits: citizens cannot enforce lease terms to which they are not parties merely by invoking the public trust.