Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Andy Rodriguez Pupo, a citizen of Cuba, entered the United States on September 24, 2023, using the CBP One app and was granted humanitarian parole. While paroled, he lived in Florida, obtained a work permit, found employment, and filed applications for asylum and adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act. His parole expired on September 4, 2025. On July 7, 2026, Pupo was stopped for a traffic violation and turned over to ICE. He was initially released but then re-detained without explanation, notice of parole revocation, or an opportunity to contest the detention. He is currently held at the Otay Mesa Detention Facility with no indication that a bond hearing or removal proceedings have occurred.
Pupo filed a pro se habeas petition on July 28, 2026, and an amended petition on August 24, 2026. The court conditionally appointed Federal Defenders of San Diego. Respondents filed a return on September 9, 2026, challenging the court's jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and arguing that Pupo's detention was mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) because his parole had expired. Pupo filed a traverse on September 16, 2026, maintaining that his due process rights were violated regardless of parole expiration.
The Court’s Holding
The court held it has jurisdiction over Pupo's habeas petition. Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent in Ibarra-Perez v. United States and Supreme Court authority in Jennings v. Rodriguez, the court concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) applies narrowly only to challenges to the Attorney General's decisions to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders. Pupo's due process challenge to the procedures surrounding his detention does not arise from those three discrete actions and therefore falls outside the jurisdictional bar.
On the merits, the court held that Pupo's due process rights were violated. The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process to noncitizens who have "passed through our gates," and the government's initial release on parole created a liberty interest that does not expire when parole expires. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, the court found: (1) Pupo has a significant liberty interest strengthened by nearly three years of residence, employment, and pending immigration applications; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation is high because ICE provided no notice, justification, or hearing before re-detention; and (3) the government failed to articulate a legitimate interest in detaining Pupo without due process. The court granted the petition, ordering immediate release subject to pre-existing parole conditions and enjoining future detention without notice and a hearing.
Key Takeaways
- The expiration of humanitarian parole does not extinguish a noncitizen's liberty interest or due process rights; the government must provide notice and a hearing before re-detention.
- 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) does not strip jurisdiction over due process challenges to detention procedures that are independent of the Attorney General's three enumerated discretionary actions.
- The Mathews v. Eldridge test weighs heavily in favor of noncitizens with established community ties when the government provides no process before revoking liberty.
- ICE must demonstrate a valid basis for revoking parole—such as the parole purpose being served or a public benefit warranting revocation—under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e), regardless of parole expiration.
- Detention without constitutionally required pre-deprivation procedures is not a legitimate government interest.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the principle that liberty interests created by government release persist beyond the formal expiration of parole, joining a growing body of district court rulings in the Ninth Circuit (including Noori v. LaRose, Pinchi v. Noem, and Osaretin v. Warden) that protect noncitizens from summary re-detention. The ruling clarifies that due process requires a pre-detention hearing even when statutory mandatory detention provisions might otherwise apply, and it narrowly construes the jurisdiction-stripping provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) to preserve habeas review of constitutional claims. The court's injunction requiring notice and a hearing before any future detention provides a procedural safeguard that may influence ICE practices in the Southern District of California.