Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Daniel Tellez Fuga, a citizen of Mexico, was apprehended by immigration authorities in the interior of the United States around September 2025 and has been continuously detained since. He was previously arrested by local law enforcement for a controlled substance offense on July 13, 2025; the charge was rejected, and he was transferred to ICE custody on August 23, 2025. Fuga filed his first habeas petition in the Northern District of Texas on January 23, 2026, which remains pending. He filed a second petition in the Eastern District of California on March 2, 2026; that court granted the petition on May 19, 2026, ordering a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within twenty-one days. Fuga filed the instant third petition on June 24, 2026, along with a motion for a temporary restraining order, which was denied as untimely. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on July 20, 2026, and Fuga opposed it on July 23, 2026. Fuga also filed a motion to amend and a proposed first amended petition.
The magistrate judge addressed four pending motions: Fuga's motion to amend (ECF No. 14), motions to expedite (ECF Nos. 12, 17), motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 16), and Respondent's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10). The court construed the motion to amend as a motion to supplement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), applicable to habeas proceedings via Rule 81(a)(2) and Habeas Rule 11, and granted it because granting supplementation is not dispositive. The motions to expedite were denied. The motion to appoint counsel was denied because the likelihood of success on the merits did not warrant appointment. The court then turned to the motion to dismiss and the merits of the habeas petition.
The Court’s Holding
The court recommended denying Respondent's motion to dismiss on all three grounds. First, the first-to-file rule is discretionary and dismissal would not serve judicial efficiency where this court had already granted a prior petition while the first remained pending. Second, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) does not apply to § 2241 petitions by immigration detainees because their detention is not pursuant to a judgment of a U.S. court, per Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2000). Third, the abuse-of-writ doctrine does not bar the petition because prolonged detention claims are inherently dynamic and evolve as detention lengthens.
On the merits, the court recommended denying the petition. For procedural due process, the Ninth Circuit has held that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)'s procedures satisfy due process and do not require a second bond hearing with the government bearing the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence after fourteen months (Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1193, 1213). Fuga did not distinguish his case. For substantive due process, the court applied three factors: length of detention, danger/flight risk, and conditions of confinement. Fuga's approximately thirteen-month detention is not excessive compared to upheld detentions of twenty-one and thirty months (Shafaq, 2026 WL 1785249; Espinoza, 2025 WL 1556590). The immigration judge's flight-risk finding — based on the speculative nature of Fuga's pending BIA appeal — was a proper application of the Guerra factors and not an abuse of discretion. The record contained no evidence regarding conditions of confinement, so that factor did not weigh in Fuga's favor. On balance, no substantive due process violation was shown.
Key Takeaways
- The first-to-file rule is discretionary and will not be applied to dismiss a later-filed habeas petition when the earlier court has already granted relief on a prior petition.
- 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)'s bar on successive petitions does not apply to immigration detainees' § 2241 petitions because their detention is not pursuant to a U.S. court judgment.
- Prolonged detention claims are inherently dynamic and not subject to abuse-of-writ dismissal merely because a prior petition raised similar claims.
- Procedural due process under § 1226(a) does not require a second bond hearing with the government bearing the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence, even after fourteen months of detention.
- A thirteen-month immigration detention, without more, does not violate substantive due process where the immigration judge's flight-risk determination properly considered relevant factors and the record shows no punitive conditions of confinement.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the Eastern District of California's framework for evaluating prolonged immigration detention claims under the Fifth Amendment, applying a three-factor test (length, danger/flight risk, conditions) and declining to extend the Jones v. Blanas presumption of punitive conditions to federal immigration detainees, consistent with Fraihat v. ICE, 16 F.4th 613 (9th Cir. 2021). It clarifies that § 2244(a) does not gatekeep immigration habeas petitions and that the first-to-file rule yields to judicial efficiency when a court has already adjudicated a prior petition on the merits. The ruling also underscores the high bar for substantive due process challenges to immigration detention, requiring a case-by-case showing that detention has become punitive rather than regulatory.