Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Yassiel Moran Perez, a Cuban citizen, entered the United States in 2019. Border Patrol encountered him in Texas in May 2019, and he was placed in expedited removal proceedings. After a positive credible fear determination in August 2019, he was served a notice to appear charging him as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and was placed in standard removal proceedings. An Immigration Judge granted bond, and he was released on October 2, 2019.
In May 2026 he was arrested for petit theft under Florida law and was transferred from state custody to ICE custody around May 29, 2026. His FBI record sheet shows the theft charge, but neither side submitted evidence on whether it was dismissed or ended in a conviction. An Immigration Judge later ordered him removed, and he appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
He petitioned for habeas relief seeking release or a bond hearing. He argued that re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing violated procedural due process. Respondents moved to dismiss, contending that detention is mandatory under § 1226(c)(1)(E) because of the theft charge and that it had not become unconstitutional on his particular facts.
The Court’s Holding
The court first concluded that the statute applies. As amended by the Laken Riley Act in January 2025, § 1226(c)(1)(E) requires detention of a noncitizen charged as inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) who is charged with, arrested for, or convicted of acts constituting the essential elements of burglary, theft, or larceny. The court found both elements met on this record: the 2019 inadmissibility charge and the May 2026 petit theft charge. It noted that other Eastern District decisions have treated petty theft arrests and charges as triggering the provision.
The court observed that courts have read the Act to reach only individuals who are currently charged or arrested, so mandatory detention is not required when charges are never filed. Because Moran Perez presented no evidence that the charge was dropped, the court said it must assume the charge is current and that detention is therefore mandated.
That did not end the inquiry. Citing the Ninth Circuit's expressed grave doubts about arbitrary prolonged detention without process in Rodriguez v. Marin, the court applied an eight-factor test drawn from Martinez v. Clark, a Western District of Washington decision that courts in this circuit have used to decide when prolonged § 1226(c) detention calls for a bond hearing. About four months of detention fell within the period Demore v. Kim treated as acceptable in upholding § 1226(c) on its face, so the first factor favored the government. Moran Perez made no argument on the remaining factors, and his removal case appeared to be moving at a reasonable pace, with an Immigration Judge decision already issued and appealed. The court could not find him entitled to relief on this record. It dismissed the petition without prejudice and directed the clerk to close the case and enter judgment for Respondents.
Key Takeaways
- Under this court's reading, a pending theft-related charge, without a conviction, can trigger mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E) for a noncitizen charged as inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7).
- The court read the provision to apply only to a currently pending charge or arrest, but it presumed the charge was current because the record did not show a dismissal.
- An as-applied due process challenge to § 1226(c) detention remains available, but about four months of detention with removal proceedings moving normally did not suffice.
- Moran Perez offered no argument on most of the eight prolonged-detention factors, and that omission contributed to the loss.
- The order leaves open the actual disposition of the theft charge, the outcome of the Board of Immigration Appeals appeal, and whether longer detention would warrant a bond hearing.
Why It Matters
The order shows how one Eastern District judge is applying the 2025 expansion of mandatory detention to a noncitizen who had been released on bond years earlier and was re-detained after a theft arrest. It treats a mere charge as sufficient. As a practical matter it leaves the detainee to produce evidence that the charge was dropped, although the court framed this as what it must assume on the record before it.
This is a district court order, and nothing in the materials suggests it is anything more than persuasive authority. It relies on other district decisions and on a Western District of Washington decision for the factors, not on a binding Ninth Circuit test. The court addressed due process only through the prolonged-detention analysis, and it dismissed without prejudice on a thin record. Later developments on the charge, the appeal, or the length of detention could change the analysis.