Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
On August 17, 2026, the court granted Salvador Flores Gonzalez's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered respondents to provide him with an individualized bond hearing at which the government bore the burden of proving flight risk or danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence. A bond hearing was held before an immigration judge on August 26, 2026, during which the IJ acknowledged the court's order and the government's burden. The government initially submitted no evidence but later introduced a Form I-213 and EARM documents indicating eight reporting violations under the Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program. Petitioner's counsel objected that the documents lacked detail, noted three violations appeared duplicative, and argued the last violation occurred over a year before re-arrest with full compliance since. The IJ denied bond, finding the government met its burden of proving flight risk by clear and convincing evidence.
Petitioner filed a motion to enforce the court's judgment on September 15, 2026, arguing the IJ's ruling failed to comply with the court's order because: (1) she relied on vague, duplicative, unsupported, and stale ATD violation evidence; (2) she improperly shifted the burden by faulting petitioner for not filing his entire Form I-589 and speculating on his asylum merits; (3) she refused to hear witness testimony; and (4) she failed to meaningfully consider alternative conditions of release. Respondents did not substantively oppose but submitted the hearing audio recordings and evidence. The court waived the prudential exhaustion requirement, citing irreparable harm from prolonged detention, but limited its review to whether the bond hearing was constitutionally adequate as required by its prior order.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the motion to enforce, finding petitioner failed to demonstrate that respondents violated the prior order or that the IJ abused her discretion in a manner violating due process. The IJ explicitly acknowledged and applied the correct legal standard—clear and convincing evidence of flight risk or danger—and considered the non-exhaustive Guerra factors, including petitioner's recent 2024 entry, speculative relief from removal, ATD violations (missed check-ins and a failed home visit), U.S. citizen child, sponsor, lawful employment, tax compliance, and community ties. The court held the IJ did not abuse her discretion in relying on the ATD violations, noting that authenticated immigration forms are presumed reliable absent evidence of material error, and that the IJ acknowledged some violations appeared duplicative but found several substantive violations supported flight risk.
The court rejected petitioner's burden-shifting argument, holding that IJs may consider the likelihood of relief from removal under Guerra and Matter of R-A-V-P, and that the clear-and-convincing standard does not relieve petitioner of the burden to produce evidence countering the government's case. Regarding the excluded witness testimony, the court found no prejudice because the sponsor's proffered testimony was largely cumulative of evidence already considered, and the IJ had already credited the sponsor's existence and corrected DHS's contrary assertion. Finally, the court held the IJ was not required to consider alternatives to detention after finding petitioner posed a flight risk, citing Ninth Circuit precedent that such consideration is only required once an IJ determines a detainee is neither dangerous nor a significant flight risk.
Key Takeaways
- A district court reviewing an IJ's bond decision after ordering a constitutionally compliant hearing applies an abuse-of-discretion standard limited to clear legal error or insufficient evidence, not reweighing of evidence.
- Authenticated immigration forms (I-213, EARM printouts) are presumed reliable absent evidence of material error, and an IJ may rely on them to support a flight-risk finding by clear and convincing evidence.
- An IJ does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof by considering the speculative nature of a detainee's relief from removal or by expecting the detainee to produce evidence supporting his case for release.
- Exclusion of witness testimony at a bond hearing does not violate due process or a court's enforcement order if the proffered testimony is cumulative and the petitioner cannot show prejudice affecting the outcome.
- An IJ is not required to consider alternatives to detention after finding a detainee poses a flight risk or danger; such consideration is only triggered if the IJ finds the detainee warrants release on bond.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the narrow scope of a district court's enforcement authority after ordering a constitutionally compliant bond hearing in immigration habeas cases. The court reaffirmed that its role is not to act as an appellate body reviewing the IJ's factual weighing or discretionary judgments, but only to ensure the hearing complied with constitutional minimums—proper burden of proof, consideration of relevant factors, and absence of clear legal error. The ruling reinforces the presumption of reliability for government immigration records and the limited circumstances under which excluded testimony constitutes prejudice. It also confirms that the duty to consider alternatives to detention arises only after an IJ determines a detainee is eligible for bond, not as a prerequisite to denying bond.