Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Kevy S.G., a noncitizen, entered the United States on December 19, 2023, and was granted humanitarian parole. He subsequently applied for adjustment of status, which remains pending, and has a United States citizen child. On January 16, 2026, Petitioner pleaded guilty to misdemeanor assault, was sentenced to time served, and was taken into ICE custody the following day. An immigration judge in the Conroe Immigration Court denied Petitioner's request for custody redetermination on March 6, 2026, providing only the one-sentence explanation: "Danger to the community." Petitioner was transferred to the Central Valley Annex Detention Facility and filed a habeas corpus petition on August 25, 2026, challenging the lawfulness of his civil immigration detention.
The government argued Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) because he was granted humanitarian parole, or alternatively, that his detention was lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Petitioner contended his detention violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because he was denied a constitutionally adequate bond hearing. The court recognized that the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including noncitizens, and that freedom from physical restraint lies at the core of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment.
The Court’s Holding
The court held that Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) because humanitarian parole does not constitute an "admission" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(B), and Petitioner was apprehended in the interior of the United States. Relying on Rodriguez Vazquez v. Garland, 183 F.4th 1160 (9th Cir. 2026), the court found that noncitizens present without admission who are apprehended in the interior are subject to the detention regime of § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2). The government's reliance on a summary of its own position in Rodriguez Vazquez was rejected as a misrepresentation of the Ninth Circuit's holding.
Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, the court found Petitioner's detention violated due process. Petitioner has a substantial liberty interest, having developed enduring attachments during his time at liberty in the United States. The risk of erroneous deprivation was high because the immigration judge's conclusory one-sentence decision failed to consider the In re Guerra factors or provide any reasoned explanation for finding Petitioner a danger to the community. Criminal history alone is insufficient to justify denial of bond without considering recency and severity. The government's interest in detaining Petitioner without proper process was low, as notice and custody hearings are routine. The court granted the petition, ordered immediate release, and enjoined re-detention under § 1226(a) absent compliance with statutory and constitutional protections, including seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral factfinder where the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that detention is justified.
Key Takeaways
- Humanitarian parole does not constitute an admission under the INA, so parolees apprehended in the interior are governed by § 1226(a), not mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).
- An immigration judge's bond denial based solely on the conclusory phrase "Danger to the community" without reasoned consideration of the In re Guerra factors constitutes an abuse of discretion and violates due process.
- Criminal history alone cannot justify denial of bond; the recency and severity of offenses must be meaningfully evaluated.
- Due process requires notice and a constitutionally compliant hearing before a neutral decisionmaker prior to detention under § 1226(a).
- The government must establish by clear and convincing evidence that its interest in detention outweighs the noncitizen's liberty interest and that no alternative to detention can mitigate the risk.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Ninth Circuit precedent in Rodriguez Vazquez that humanitarian parolees apprehended in the interior are entitled to the procedural protections of § 1226(a), rejecting government attempts to expand mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). The ruling underscores that immigration judges must provide reasoned, individualized bond determinations that engage with the In re Guerra factors, and that conclusory findings are insufficient to satisfy due process. The court's injunction against re-detention without seven days' notice, a pre-deprivation hearing, and a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard establishes a robust procedural floor for future detentions under § 1226(a) in this district.