Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Salvador Zamora Plasencia, a native and citizen of Cuba, entered the United States in 1989. In 1998, an immigration judge ordered him removed to Cuba, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal in 1999. He was released from immigration custody on an order of supervised release (OSUP) in June 2000. He remained on supervision for approximately 26 years until May 15, 2026, when ICE re-detained him during a mandatory check-in with a separate agency in Florida and revoked his OSUP. Plasencia filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on October 19, 2026, challenging the lawfulness of his detention.
Respondents argued that Plasencia is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) because he continuously refuses to cooperate with ICE's attempts to remove him to Mexico. They contended his removal is reasonably foreseeable because Mexico accepts certain noncitizens from the United States. Notably, respondents did not submit a copy of the removal order, and all supporting documentation indicated Plasencia was ordered removed only to Cuba, not Mexico. The government did not allege any violation of OSUP terms as the basis for revocation.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus, finding that respondents failed to demonstrate a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future as required to justify revocation of Plasencia's release. Because Plasencia was previously released on OSUP and subsequently re-detained, the burden shifted to respondents to show changed circumstances regarding removal likelihood under Vu v. Noem. The court determined that Plasencia's removal order designated only Cuba, not Mexico, and that Mexico's acceptance of Cuban nationals appears contingent on the noncitizen's consent—which Plasencia has refused by declining to sign notices of intent to remove to Mexico.
The court incorporated its prior reasoning in Ruiz-Acosta v. Central Valley Annex and Obando Vargas v. Blanche, where it had deemed the government's position—that Cuban nationals must cooperate with removal to Mexico despite lacking removal orders to that country or face indefinite detention—to be frivolous. The court ordered Plasencia's immediate release on the same OSUP conditions in effect prior to his May 15, 2026 re-detention, enjoined respondents from re-detaining him absent exigent circumstances without notice and a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge, granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and denied his motions for temporary restraining order and appointment of counsel as moot.
Key Takeaways
- The government bears the burden of showing a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future to justify re-detaining a noncitizen previously released on supervision.
- A removal order to one country (Cuba) does not authorize detention for removal to a different country (Mexico) where the noncitizen has not consented.
- Mexico's acceptance of Cuban nationals for removal appears contingent on the noncitizen's consent, which cannot be coerced through indefinite detention.
- The court deemed the government's position—that refusal to consent to third-country removal justifies indefinite detention—frivolous and an abuse of judicial resources.
- Re-detention after long-term supervision requires notice and a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge absent exigent circumstances.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces statutory limits on post-removal-order detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), particularly for Cuban nationals whom the government seeks to remove to Mexico without a removal order to that country. The ruling aligns with a line of Eastern District of California cases rejecting the government's theory that detention can be used to coerce consent to third-country removals.
By requiring a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge for any future re-detention, the order establishes procedural safeguards against arbitrary revocation of long-standing supervision. The court's characterization of the government's position as frivolous signals growing judicial intolerance for detention practices that circumvent removal-order requirements.