Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Maridel Florentina B.A. entered the United States without inspection on July 26, 2022, was detained by immigration authorities, and subsequently released into the United States. Over the following years, she built a life in the country, has no criminal history, and submitted letters of support from family and friends. On July 21, 2025, she was detained again after reporting to an ICE office in Fresno, California, and transferred to the California City Immigration Processing Center. At the time of her arrest, she was not subject to a final order of removal. Nearly seven months later, on February 22, 2026, an immigration judge ordered her removed and pretermitted her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, but that order is not final because Petitioner has appealed. Petitioner filed the instant habeas corpus petition on September 18, 2026, challenging the lawfulness of her civil detention and seeking immediate release.
Respondents contended that Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), but acknowledged that Ninth Circuit precedent holds her detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), making her eligible for a custody determination hearing. Respondents claimed Petitioner would obtain a custody redetermination hearing upon request. The court recognized its habeas jurisdiction over challenges to immigration detention under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and the constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus to every individual detained within the United States under Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
The Court’s Holding
The court found Petitioner has a clear liberty interest protected by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, rejecting Respondents' argument that she is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). Citing Rodriguez Vazquez, 2026 WL 2196424, the court held that § 1225(b)(2) applies only to noncitizens entering at the border, while individuals like Petitioner apprehended in the interior are subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a). The government's prior decision to release Petitioner on conditions constituted an 'implicit promise' she would not be re-detained if she complied with release terms, and the record showed no violation of those terms. Her years at liberty and the life she built created a powerful interest in continued freedom.
Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, the court found: (1) Petitioner's private interest in liberty is substantial, underscored by the time she spent at liberty; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable because civil immigration detention requires a 'special justification' under Zadvydas, and here removal was not imminent under a final order, Respondents did not claim she is a danger or flight risk, and she has no criminal history; and (3) the government's interest in detaining her without notice and a hearing is low, and the burden of providing such process is minimal because notice and custody hearings are routine under § 1226(a). The court concluded Petitioner was owed notice and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, and the failure to provide these violated the Fifth Amendment. The appropriate remedy is immediate release. The court also enjoined re-detention absent seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation hearing where the government must show by clear and convincing evidence that detention is justified.
Key Takeaways
- Noncitizens apprehended in the interior of the United States are subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), per Ninth Circuit precedent.
- A noncitizen previously released on conditions who complies with those terms retains a strong liberty interest protected by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
- Due process requires notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker before the government may detain such individuals, absent a final order of removal.
- The government must show by clear and convincing evidence that its interest in detention outweighs the individual's liberty interest and that no alternative to detention can mitigate the risk.
- A pending appeal of a removal order means the order is not final, and a constitutional due process claim does not evaporate with a shifting statutory basis for detention authority.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces constitutional due process protections for noncitizens in immigration detention, particularly those with extended periods of lawful presence and compliance with release conditions. By applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test and rejecting the government's mandatory detention argument under § 1225(b)(2), the court affirms that interior apprehensions trigger the procedural safeguards of § 1226(a). The injunction against re-detention without seven days' notice and a hearing with a clear-and-convincing evidence standard sets a robust procedural floor. The ruling aligns with a growing body of district court decisions in the Ninth Circuit holding that due process claims survive the entry of a non-final removal order and that statutory 'shall detain' provisions yield to as-applied constitutional challenges.