Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Jonathan Tallman sued Dillon Spencer over online statements that, he alleged, amounted to defamation, defamation per se, and false light. The statements involved sexual harassment allegations. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed Tallman's First Amended Complaint under Oregon's anti-SLAPP statute, Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.150(1). It concluded that the actual malice standard governed his claims and that he had not made the required showing of actual malice, even after being granted leave to amend. Because leave to amend had already been given, the amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
Tallman appealed. The panel was Circuit Judges Friedland and De Alba and District Judge Lasnik, sitting by designation from the Western District of Washington. It heard argument in Portland on September 15, 2026, and had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. It reviewed the grant of the anti-SLAPP motion to strike de novo. It also reviewed de novo the legal question whether the actual malice standard applies. The issues were whether Tallman, as a recent candidate, had to meet the New York Times v. Sullivan standard for statements bearing on fitness for office, and whether he contested the separate conclusion that he had not shown actual malice. The memorandum does not decide whether Spencer's statements were true or false.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It explained that the Sullivan actual malice standard applies to defamation claims by candidates for public office so long as the challenged statements relate to their fitness for office, citing Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy and Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron. The panel treated Tallman as effectively still a candidate when the statements were made. His most recent campaign had ended just three months earlier, and he appeared likely to run again because he had run in each of the past four years. Because the statements involved sexual harassment allegations, the panel held that they related to his fitness for office. The district court therefore correctly applied the actual malice standard. The panel also cited Partington v. Bugliosi for the observation that courts of appeals have concluded the passage of time does not change a limited purpose public figure's status.
On the dispositive point, Tallman did not challenge on appeal the district court's conclusion that he failed to make a prima facie showing of actual malice. The district court therefore correctly entered judgment dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice under Oregon's anti-SLAPP law, and the judgment was affirmed. The disposition is an unpublished memorandum and is not precedent except as Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides.
Key Takeaways
- In this memorandum, a plaintiff whose campaign ended three months earlier and who had run in each of the previous four years was treated as effectively still a candidate for actual malice purposes.
- The panel held that statements involving sexual harassment allegations related to the plaintiff's fitness for office, which brought the actual malice standard into play.
- Failing to challenge on appeal the finding that actual malice was not prima facie shown left the dismissal undisturbed.
- Review of both the anti-SLAPP ruling and the legal question whether actual malice applies was de novo.
- The ruling is unpublished and non-precedential, citable only as Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 allows, and it did not decide whether any statement was true or false.
Why It Matters
The memorandum shows how a federal court applying Oregon's anti-SLAPP statute treats a plaintiff who is between campaigns. The panel looked to recent and repeated candidacies rather than a formal campaign period, and it did not treat a three-month gap as ending candidate status. In practice, a plaintiff in that position who sues over statements touching fitness for office must support the claim with a prima facie showing of actual malice at the anti-SLAPP stage. A plaintiff who does not contest the lack of that showing on appeal will likely lose.
The decision's weight is limited. Because it is unpublished, it binds no later panel and is citable only under Rule 36-3. It resolved nothing about falsity. Open questions include how courts would treat longer gaps between campaigns or statements less tied to fitness for office. The affirmance leaves Tallman's claims dismissed with prejudice and nothing pending in this appeal.