Reported / Citable
Background
In 2020, Martin Lackey-Garcia stabbed four people at a Sacramento County outpatient mental health center; two died. He was charged with two murders with a multiple-murder special circumstance, two attempted murders, and weapon and prior-strike allegations. Defense counsel raised a doubt about his competence under Penal Code section 1368. A psychologist who interviewed him in 2021 found him competent and noted signs of feigned symptoms. A second psychologist, whom he repeatedly refused to meet, gave a self-described compromised opinion, based on records and counsel's input, that he was incompetent.
At the October 2023 competency hearing, the defense called the second psychologist, his mother, and a sheriff's deputy. After the defense rested, Lackey-Garcia asked to testify; counsel responded that the decision rested solely with counsel, and the court noted that position. The prosecution called the first psychologist, who declined to opine on present competence, and played recordings of jail visits with his mother. The court also noticed his self-written motions, found him competent, and later let him represent himself. At trial he admitted the stabbings but claimed self-defense against a perceived law enforcement conspiracy. The jury convicted on all counts, and he received life without parole plus 30 years to life.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed. In the published portion, it held that once a doubt about competence has been declared, counsel retains authority to decide whether the defendant testifies at the competency hearing, so the trial court did not err in deferring to counsel. Following People v. Masterson and People v. Bell, the court reasoned that a competency proceeding is a special proceeding with the limited purpose of assessing present competence, in which the defendant plays a lesser role. It declined to adopt the Bell concurring and dissenting opinion's balancing analysis drawn from People v. Allen, noting that Medina v. California rejected the Mathews framework for state competency procedures and that a defendant also has an interest in not being tried while incompetent. It distinguished Guardianship of Waite and United States v. Gillenwater, and treated a statement in People v. Harris as dictum.
The court also held that substantial evidence supported the competency finding, which the defendant challenged only as to his ability to assist counsel rationally. A trial court need not accept even an uncontradicted expert opinion of incompetence. The second psychologist conceded her opinion was compromised by the lack of an interview, offered little analysis linking the records to an inability to cooperate, and relied on a mistaken premise that a judge rather than counsel had raised the doubt. The trial court could still weigh the earlier interview-based evaluation despite its age, the recorded calls showing calm, strategic discussion, and the self-filed motions. The court said counsel's general assertions and a prior judge's comments about self-representation did not compel a different result.
In the part of the opinion not certified for publication, the court rejected the challenge to a pinpoint instruction, given over objection, that unreasonable self-defense does not apply when the defendant's actions are entirely delusional. Applying People v. Elmore and People v. Chang, it found enough evidence for a jury to conclude his belief had no objective correlate, citing his testimony that staff were law enforcement agents and his statement to police. Having found no error, it did not reach his argument that the instruction combined with the prosecutor's closing was prejudicial. The judgment was affirmed.
Key Takeaways
- Under this published holding, once a doubt about competence is declared, defense counsel may decide whether the defendant testifies at the competency hearing, even over the defendant's stated wish.
- The reasoning treats a competency hearing as a special proceeding rather than a criminal trial, and the court declined to extend the right to testify recognized in sexually violent predator proceedings.
- A trial court may give less weight to an expert opinion that the expert herself calls compromised by the lack of an interview and that does not connect the records to an inability to assist counsel.
- Earlier interview-based evaluations, recorded conversations, and the defendant's own filings can supply substantial evidence of present competence.
- The ruling on the delusion pinpoint instruction is in the unpublished part of the opinion and should not be cited as precedent.
Why It Matters
This is a published Third District decision that follows Bell and confirms that a defendant whose competence is in doubt cannot insist on testifying over counsel's decision. It arose where counsel declined to call the defendant and the court deferred; the court noted the 2024 amendments to section 1369 but did not rest its analysis on them.
Only the competency discussion carries precedential weight. The self-defense instruction ruling in part II is unpublished and is not citable authority, and the court left open whether the instruction, combined with the prosecutor's argument, could have been prejudicial.