California Case Summaries

Cannavan v. Newsom — Prior Dismissals as ‘Duplicative’ Are Not Strikes Under § 1915(g) Without Findings of Frivolousness or Malice

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Cannavan v. Newsom, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
Judge
Jennifer L. Thurston (Joe Biden, 2021)
Date Decided
2026-10-14
Docket No.
1:26-cv-06993
Status
Unreported
Topics
in forma pauperis, three strikes rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), duplicative lawsuits, frivolous or malicious dismissal, findings and recommendations, civil rights

Background

Patrick Cannavan sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in an Eastern District of California civil rights action against Governor Gavin Newsom and others. A magistrate judge reviewed his litigation history and, in findings and recommendations dated September 17, 2026, concluded that five earlier Cannavan v. Newsom actions, each dismissed on August 31, 2026, counted as strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The magistrate judge also found that he had not satisfied the imminent danger exception and recommended denying the application.

The five earlier cases were numbered 1:26-cv-6034, 6035, 6046, 6048 and 6051. In recommending that they be counted, the magistrate judge pointed to language in the earlier findings stating that duplicative lawsuits filed by plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis are subject to dismissal as frivolous or malicious under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The district judge then examined what the earlier findings had actually decided.

The Court’s Holding

Judge Thurston declined the findings and recommendations, granted the application to proceed in forma pauperis, and referred the matter to the magistrate judge for further proceedings. She explained that a dismissal counts as a strike only when it was made on the grounds that the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim. Relying on Ray v. Lara and Harris v. Harris, she noted the Ninth Circuit's narrow reading of the statute: a case not dismissed on one of the enumerated grounds does not count. 'Duplicative' is not among those grounds. Cato v. United States upheld dismissal of a repetitive complaint under the former version of the statute but did not hold that such a dismissal is automatically a strike.

The court acknowledged that a duplicative action may also be found frivolous or malicious, but said no such finding was made in the five earlier actions. The language the magistrate judge relied on appeared in the legal standards sections of those findings, not in the analysis of the plaintiff's claims, which was limited to a finding that each action was duplicative. Without additional findings of frivolousness or maliciousness, the dismissals do not qualify as strikes. The court cited a district court decision, Ramsey v. Lujan, and an unpublished Third Circuit decision, Washington v. Gilmore, as support. The order does not separately analyze the imminent danger exception, and it does not address the merits of the civil rights claims.

Key Takeaways

  • A dismissal described only as duplicative does not count as a strike under § 1915(g) unless the court also found the action frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim.
  • Recitations of general legal standards in earlier findings do not substitute for case-specific findings tied to the statutory grounds.
  • The court did not hold that duplicative suits can never be frivolous or malicious, only that such findings were absent from these five dismissals.
  • The ruling resolves only the in forma pauperis question; the underlying claims remain to be screened and decided in further proceedings before the magistrate judge.

Why It Matters

The order shows how closely a court will read earlier dismissals when deciding whether a litigant has accumulated strikes. Because losing in forma pauperis eligibility can effectively end a case for an indigent plaintiff, the court looked to the actual basis for each earlier dismissal rather than the label or the recitation of legal standards.

This is an unpublished district court order, so it is not binding precedent, and it rests on Ninth Circuit authority the judge cited. It may still be useful for litigants and courts in the Eastern District when earlier dismissals were framed as duplicative without further findings. It does not decide whether any of the earlier actions could have been dismissed as frivolous or malicious, and it leaves the merits of the pending case open.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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