Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner, a federal immigration detainee proceeding without counsel, filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Eastern District of California. Among other claims, he challenged his indefinite post-removal detention under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). That challenge was Count Three. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Sean C. Riordan under Local Rule 302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
On September 11, 2026, the assigned district judge, Judge Coggins, issued a temporary restraining order directing Petitioner's release. It barred re-detention by immigration officials absent certain constitutional protections, including, at a minimum, strict compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). That order specifically rejected the government's argument that Petitioner's refusal to acquiesce to removal to a third country, where an Immigration Judge had not ordered him removed, was a failure to cooperate with removal permitting continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C). It cited two Eastern District of California decisions, Suarez v. Chestnut and Garcia v. Warden, Central Valley Annex.
On September 17, 2026, the magistrate judge directed the parties to submit additional merits briefs, or a stipulation on how to resolve the petition, within 14 days. Respondent answered that the petition should be denied as moot because Petitioner had been released. Petitioner filed no response.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge recommended rejecting the mootness argument. The court had granted only temporary relief pending final resolution on the merits, so the petition remained unresolved unless Respondents conceded that Petitioner's re-detention was unlawful, and the findings identify no such concession. Quoting Sorto G.J. v. Warden of the Golden State Annex and citing L.S. v. Santacruz, the findings reason that a TRO or preliminary injunction by definition affords no permanent relief. Dismissal as moot would therefore leave Respondents free to re-detain Petitioner without pre-deprivation process.
On the merits, the findings adopt and incorporate the reasons stated in the court's minute order granting the TRO rather than restating them. On that basis they recommend granting the petition on the Fifth Amendment due process claim in Count Three, citing Zadvydas. The findings further recommend denying the remaining claims in the interests of judicial economy because the requested relief has been granted, making the TRO relief permanent, denying the motion to appoint counsel as moot, and closing the case.
These are recommendations only. They go to Judge Coggins, and any party may file written objections within seven days of service. The magistrate judge shortened that period because of the nature of the relief and because the parties had ample opportunity to brief. Failure to object may waive the right to appeal the district court's order.
Key Takeaways
- The document is a magistrate judge's recommendation, not a final order, so the protections in force until the district judge acts remain those of the existing TRO.
- A request to deny a habeas petition as moot after court-ordered release was rejected because temporary relief does not prevent re-detention without pre-deprivation process.
- The incorporated TRO reasoning rejects the theory that refusing removal to a third country, for which no Immigration Judge has ordered removal, is a failure to cooperate under § 1231(a)(1)(C).
- The recommended grant is limited to Count Three, and the other claims would be denied for judicial economy rather than decided on their merits.
- Objections are due within seven days of service, and failure to object may waive the right to appeal.
Why It Matters
The findings show how the Eastern District of California may handle government mootness arguments after a TRO has secured release in post-removal detention cases. The court treats the temporary order as insufficient and moves toward final, permanent relief. The findings rely on other district court decisions, such as Sorto and L.S. v. Santacruz, rather than binding appellate authority, so their persuasive weight is limited.
As an unadopted recommendation from a district court, the document carries no independent binding force and is not precedent. It incorporates the TRO's reasoning rather than restating it, so the fuller analysis lies in the earlier minute order. Open questions include whether the district judge will adopt the findings, whether objections will be filed, and what compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) would require if re-detention were later attempted.