Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Clifford Marcus Winkles, representing himself, appealed an order of the United States District Court for the Central District of California denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The order was entered in a criminal case numbered 2:00-cr-00359-RGK-2, and the heading identifies Judge R. Gary Klausner as the presiding district judge. The short memorandum does not describe the underlying offense, the sentence, or the grounds Winkles offered for release, so none of those matters is addressed here.
The district court denied the motion for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On appeal, Winkles argued that the court erred in denying his motion for lack of exhaustion. As the panel describes the record, he submitted a request to the warden only after he had already filed his motion in the district court, and the warden denied that request. The government invoked the exhaustion requirement. The panel decided the appeal without oral argument on a submission dated October 27, 2026, and noted that it had received and considered Winkles's reply brief.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished memorandum disposition and rejected Winkles's exhaustion argument as unavailing. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) allows a defendant to move in district court only after he has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on his behalf, or after 30 days have lapsed from the warden's receipt of such a request. Because Winkles's request to the warden came after his motion was filed, the panel concluded that it was too late. It cited United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 2021), for the propositions that a defendant must exhaust before filing a compassionate release motion in the district court and must do so anew for each such motion.
The panel added an alternative ground. Even if the request had been timely, Winkles did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the warden's denial, citing United States v. Wright, 46 F.4th 938, 945 n.3 (9th Cir. 2022). Because the government properly invoked exhaustion, and because Winkles's challenges to the exhaustion requirement were not supported by the record or the law, the district court properly denied the motion. The panel relied on Keller's holding that the administrative exhaustion requirement is mandatory and must be enforced when properly raised by the government.
The disposition is confined to exhaustion. The panel did not decide whether Winkles has extraordinary and compelling reasons for release or how the sentencing factors would weigh. It denied his pending motions without elaboration and entered the disposition AFFIRMED. The memorandum does not say whether the denial was with or without prejudice, and it does not decide what Winkles may do next.
Key Takeaways
- A request sent to the warden after the compassionate release motion has already been filed in district court comes too late, according to the panel's reading of § 3582(c)(1)(A).
- Under Keller, as cited by the panel, exhaustion must be completed anew for each compassionate release motion, so earlier administrative efforts do not carry over to a later motion.
- The panel treated exhaustion as mandatory and enforceable when the government properly invokes it. The memorandum does not describe the requirement as jurisdictional.
- Even a timely request would not have helped Winkles, because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the warden's denial.
- The ruling rests only on exhaustion and leaves open the merits of any compassionate release claim.
Why It Matters
This is a not-for-publication memorandum, so it is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Its value lies in showing how the panel applies published circuit authority, namely Keller and Wright, to a self-represented movant who sought administrative relief only after going to court. The binding rule comes from those published decisions and not from this memorandum.
For incarcerated litigants and the lawyers who assist them, the practical lesson is sequencing. The request goes to the warden first. The defendant then either completes the administrative appeal of any denial or waits out the 30-day period before filing, and repeats the process for each new motion. Because the requirement is enforced when the government raises it, a premature filing invites denial without any look at the merits. The memorandum leaves open the merits of Winkles's release request and whether he may file a new motion after completing the administrative process.