Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Jeff Baoliang Zhang, representing himself, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Central District of California. He named the City of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Police Department, and several other defendants. The memorandum describes the action only as one relating to his criminal proceedings and the loss of his personal property. It does not recite the underlying charges, the conviction, or the facts of the alleged property loss.
District Judge Hernan Diego Vera dismissed the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the screening provision that directs dismissal for failure to state a claim. The memorandum does not say whether the dismissal was with or without leave to amend, so that question cannot be answered from this disposition. Zhang appealed.
The Ninth Circuit panel of Judges Silverman, Forrest, and VanDyke found the case suitable for decision without oral argument and submitted it on October 27, 2026. The court asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reviewed the screening dismissal de novo, citing Watison v. Carter.
The Court’s Holding
The panel affirmed. First, it held that the district court properly dismissed Zhang's claims challenging his criminal proceedings as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The panel reasoned that success on those claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, and that Zhang had not demonstrated the conviction had been invalidated. It quoted Heck for the rule that such a complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can show the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. The memorandum's own wording says success would imply the "validity" of the conviction, which appears to be a slip given the Heck standard it quotes.
Second, the panel held that the district court properly dismissed the property claims because Zhang failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim. Relying on Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), it explained that an unauthorized deprivation of property, whether negligent or intentional, is not actionable if the state provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. Citing Miranda v. City of Casa Grande, 15 F.4th 1219 (9th Cir. 2021), it noted that state tort law provides adequate post-deprivation process. The memorandum does not analyze Zhang's specific allegations beyond this conclusion.
The panel rejected as meritless Zhang's contention that the district court should have appointed pro bono counsel, without elaborating. It declined to consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal, citing Padgett v. Wright, denied all pending requests, and affirmed. The disposition is unpublished and not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Key Takeaways
- A § 1983 claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence must be dismissed unless the plaintiff shows the conviction has already been invalidated.
- A claim over an unauthorized loss of property, whether negligent or intentional, generally fails where the state offers a meaningful post-deprivation remedy, and the panel treated state tort law as such a remedy.
- A plaintiff who believes the Heck bar or the post-deprivation rule does not apply should plead specific supporting facts in the district court, because a general complaint about criminal proceedings and lost property did not suffice here.
- New arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered, so they must first be presented to the district court.
- The panel rejected the pro bono counsel argument as meritless without explanation, so the memorandum offers little guidance on the standard for appointing counsel.
Why It Matters
Because this is an unpublished memorandum, it is not precedent except as allowed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Its value is as an illustration of how the panel applied settled authorities, namely Heck, Hudson, and Miranda, to a pro se complaint that combined challenges to criminal proceedings with a property-loss claim.
The relief is narrow. The affirmance leaves the district court's dismissal in place. The memorandum does not address qualified immunity, the merits of any underlying conviction, or whether Zhang may still pursue a state-law remedy for the property loss. It also does not say whether the Heck-based dismissal is without prejudice. Heck dismissals turn on the conviction not having been invalidated, not on a ruling that the underlying allegations are wrong, but this memorandum does not discuss what would follow if that condition were later met.