Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Francois Tabi, proceeding pro se, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Michael Stephenson and unnamed Walmart security officers. Tabi alleged that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was directed to leave a Walmart Supercenter premises while registering voters and distributing ballot measures. According to the record, Walmart security asked Tabi to leave and called the police after he refused. Deputy Stephenson responded, investigated whether Tabi had outstanding warrants, and advised Tabi a second time that he was trespassing on private property and would be arrested if he refused to leave. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Deputy Stephenson, and Tabi appealed.
The unpublished memorandum affirmed summary judgment on all claims and denied the appellant’s miscellaneous motion.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on all claims. First, the court held there is no First Amendment right to freedom of speech on privately owned shopping center property, citing Hudgens v. NLRB. Second, the court found Tabi failed to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim because he offered insufficient evidence that Deputy Stephenson acted with retaliatory animus; the deputy’s actions—investigating warrants and enforcing trespass laws at the property owner’s request—were not shown to be motivated by Tabi’s protected speech. Third, the court rejected the equal protection ‘class-of-one’ claim because Tabi failed to show he was similarly situated to other signature gatherers, noting it was undisputed that Tabi was the only one who set up a card table and chair close to a Walmart entrance.
The decision turns on the specific record and procedural setting described above. Its operative effect is limited to the relief stated in the disposition; issues the court did not reach remain open on remand or before the assigned district judge, as applicable.
Key Takeaways
- There is no First Amendment right to engage in expressive activity on privately owned shopping center property under federal law (Hudgens v. NLRB).
- To succeed on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show the adverse action would not have been taken absent retaliatory motive; mere enforcement of trespass laws at a property owner’s request does not establish retaliatory animus.
- A ‘class-of-one’ equal protection claim requires the plaintiff to be similarly situated to comparators in all material respects; distinctive conduct (e.g., setting up a table and chair at an entrance) defeats the claim.
- The court may affirm summary judgment on any ground supported by the record.
- The appellant’s motion for miscellaneous relief was denied.
Why It Matters
This memorandum disposition reinforces the limited reach of the First Amendment on private property and the high bar for proving retaliatory animus and class-of-one equal protection claims. It clarifies that law enforcement officers responding to a private property owner’s trespass complaint do not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments by enforcing state trespass laws, absent evidence of retaliatory motive or selective enforcement against similarly situated individuals. The decision is not precedential under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
For California practitioners, the practical lesson is to match the requested remedy to the governing procedural vehicle and to preserve a record addressing the court’s stated legal test. The ruling should not be read more broadly than its posture permits.
The memorandum also illustrates that a class-of-one equal-protection theory requires materially similar comparators, not merely other people engaged in broadly similar expressive activity.