Reported / Citable
Background
Michael Krause served as superintendent of the Adelanto Elementary School District in San Bernardino County. Over roughly two years, three of the district’s executive assistants — referred to as S.A., X.L., and I.P. — experienced a pattern of unsolicited surveillance and contact from Krause: he texted photos of them taken without their knowledge at Walmart, Chipotle, and in one case outside an employee’s home at night; he sent eight text messages in a single minute when one employee did not respond; and he physically poked two of the women in workplace settings, telling one “Your mistakes are killing me.” The women reported his conduct to police and district officials in May 2024.
The district terminated Krause in June 2024. As part of his departure, Krause and the district signed a separation agreement containing a broad general release of claims. The district’s release covered “any and all actions, causes of action, claims, demands, damages” arising out of Krause’s employment. Within months, Krause ran for a seat on the district’s own Board of Trustees and won in November 2024, placing him in regular contact with the women he had allegedly harassed.
In October 2024, the district petitioned for a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) — a California statutory tool under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8 that allows employers to seek court protection on behalf of targeted employees. Krause argued that the general release in the separation agreement barred the district from bringing the WVRO. The trial court disagreed, granted the WVRO for a four-year term, and included a provision barring Krause from commenting on the order or the WVRO proceedings at any regular board meeting. Krause appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed the WVRO but modified it on two points. First, it rejected Krause’s waiver argument, holding that an employer’s right to prosecute a WVRO on behalf of its employees is unwaivable under Civil Code section 3513. That statute bars private agreements that contravene laws established for a public reason. Because the WVRO statute exists primarily to combat workplace violence, threats, and harassment — not solely to benefit employers — the right to seek one cannot be contracted away, even in a comprehensive employment separation agreement. The court drew an analogy to the California Supreme Court’s holding in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, which found FEHA rights unwaivable on the same grounds.
Second, the court clarified how the 2023 amendment to section 527.8 — which expanded the statute to cover harassment, not just unlawful violence — changes the standard for future harm. Under the prior version of the statute, courts required a reasonable probability of future violence. Under the amended law (effective January 1, 2025), a reasonable probability of continued harassment suffices. The court found the evidence here adequate: Krause’s conduct spanned two years, multiple locations, and multiple victims; he showed no remorse; and he had positioned himself to remain in the women’s professional lives as a board trustee.
Third, the court struck down the provision barring Krause from discussing the WVRO or WVRO proceedings at board meetings. Because Krause is an elected official with First Amendment rights to speak on matters of public concern at public meetings — including, for example, when voting on the district’s legal budget or whether to retain the law firm that prosecuted the WVRO — a blanket speech prohibition was overbroad and not narrowly tailored. The remaining WVRO provisions (no harassment, no contact) still apply at board meetings. Finally, the court modified the WVRO duration from four years to the statutory maximum of three years under section 527.8(l)(1).
Key Takeaways
- An employer’s right to seek a workplace violence restraining order under CCP section 527.8 cannot be waived in an employment separation agreement — even a broad, mutual general release. Courts will treat this right as unwaivable under Civil Code section 3513 because workplace safety is a public policy purpose, not a private benefit.
- As of January 1, 2025, the WVRO statute covers harassment in addition to violence. Employers no longer must show a risk of future physical violence to obtain or maintain a WVRO — a reasonable probability of continued harassing conduct is enough.
- A WVRO cannot include a blanket ban on an elected official discussing the restraining order at public meetings. Courts must tailor speech restrictions narrowly; a categorical prohibition goes further than necessary when other WVRO provisions already prohibit harassment and contact.
- WVROs issued after a noticed hearing are capped at three years under CCP section 527.8(l)(1). Trial courts that impose four-year terms — even with good intentions — will be corrected on appeal.
- For HR and employment counsel: conduct a full WVRO analysis separately from settlement drafting. A release of “all claims” does not bar a future employer from seeking injunctive protection for its workforce, regardless of what the agreement says.
Why It Matters
This decision closes what might have seemed like a loophole for employers and terminated employees alike: the idea that a comprehensive separation agreement could preclude the employer from later seeking a restraining order if the former employee poses a continuing threat. California’s WVRO statute now reaches harassment (post-2025), meaning an employer who settles an employment dispute — and includes the broadest possible mutual release — retains the right to go to court on behalf of its workers if harassment resumes or continues. That is particularly significant in situations like this one, where a former employee returns to the same workplace in a new capacity.
The First Amendment holding matters too, especially for public-sector employers and school districts. Courts must be careful about restricting the speech of elected board members, even when those members are the subject of a restraining order. The ruling does not insulate an elected official from consequences if they use board meetings to harass protected parties — those acts are still prohibited. But it confirms that courts cannot impose a subject-matter ban on an elected official’s speech without a specific showing that the speech itself constitutes harassment or an unlawful contact.