Reported / Citable
Background
In 1994, a San Francisco jury convicted Reginald Tyler of second-degree murder. Decades later, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1437, which narrowed the theories under which a person can be convicted of murder — most notably eliminating liability for murder based solely on participation in another crime under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and tightening felony murder rules. The legislation also created a post-conviction petition process, now codified at Penal Code section 1172.6, allowing people serving murder sentences to seek resentencing if they could no longer be convicted under the new law.
Tyler filed such a petition. The prosecution conceded he had made a prima facie case, and the trial court issued an order to show cause, advancing the case to a full evidentiary hearing. At that stage, the prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder under current California law. The trial court sits not as a rubber stamp reviewing what a jury might do, but as an independent fact-finder — weighing the evidence itself and reaching its own conclusion.
During the hearing and in discussions with counsel, the trial court repeatedly used the phrase “could be convicted” to describe the prosecution’s burden — language that sounds like the substantial evidence test rather than an independent determination of guilt. Tyler did not object at the time, but after the court denied his petition, he appealed, arguing the court had applied the wrong standard of proof.
The Court’s Holding
The First District affirmed the denial of Tyler’s petition, but published its opinion expressly to address an error it sees recurring in trial courts across California. The proper standard at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing is clear: the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder under current law. The trial court acts as an independent fact-finder — not as a court reviewing whether the evidence could support a jury verdict. The “could be convicted” formulation misframes the question and, if taken literally, would reduce the inquiry to something like a substantial evidence review, which is the wrong standard and a lower bar.
In Tyler’s case, the court found no reversible error because the trial court’s actual ruling used correct language. When it announced its decision, the court said its task was to determine “whether based on the evidence that was provided, Mr. Tyler’s guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of second-degree murder” under current law — and it applied that standard. The earlier use of “could be convicted” during colloquy appeared in the context of discussing the substantive legal arguments, not in articulating the standard of proof. Tyler’s own counsel’s failure to object at the time further confirmed the court was not misapplying the test.
The opinion expressly traces the source of the confusion: section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3) uses “could not presently be convicted” language as an eligibility criterion at the prima facie stage. That phrasing appropriately belongs to the threshold screening. It does not, however, describe the standard at the evidentiary hearing — and the court cautioned that some published decisions have inadvertently repeated it in the evidentiary-hearing context without flagging the problem.
Key Takeaways
- At a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, the trial court is an independent fact-finder who must determine whether the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder under current law — not whether a jury “could” convict them.
- The phrase “could be convicted” belongs at the prima facie stage of a 1172.6 petition, not at the evidentiary hearing. When it appears in evidentiary-hearing records, it can constitute reversible error if the surrounding context does not make clear the court understood the correct standard.
- Defense counsel should object on the record whenever a trial court uses “could be convicted” language at the evidentiary stage — the failure to object forfeited the argument in this case, though the court noted it was not deciding the issue on forfeiture grounds.
- For prosecutors: articulate the correct standard clearly in briefing and argument. Courts that review jury instructions — as the court did here — can demonstrate their correct understanding, but that evidence may not always be present in the record.
- Published decisions that have repeated “could be convicted” language at the evidentiary hearing stage are not authoritative endorsements of that formulation; the First District expressly identifies this as a recurring problem that can warrant reversal when clarifying context is absent.
Why It Matters
SB 1437 resentencing petitions under section 1172.6 have generated an enormous volume of litigation since the law took effect in 2019. Thousands of people convicted under now-invalidated felony murder and natural and probable consequences theories have filed petitions, and trial courts statewide are handling evidentiary hearings on those petitions every day. The First District published this opinion specifically because the “could be convicted” error is not isolated — it has appeared in multiple published opinions and almost certainly in many more unpublished ones. Getting the standard right matters: it is the difference between a court that reviews the record deferentially and a court that independently weighs the evidence and makes its own credibility and factual findings.
For criminal defense practitioners, the practical takeaway is to make a clean objection whenever trial courts use the wrong formulation. A record that shows the court misstated the standard, without clarifying context in the ruling, creates a colorable appellate argument. For courts and prosecutors, the opinion is a clear reminder to use precise language — not because imprecision will necessarily lead to reversal, but because it will lead to appeals, and some of those appeals will succeed.