Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Anna M. Murphy, representing herself, sued Charley D. Smith, his attorney John Henderson, Damon Smith, Ryan Smith, Winged “S” Ranch, LLC, two Smith family trusts, and Placer County. The dispute arises from a 2013 contract for deed under which she agreed to buy real property in Lincoln, California from Charley. The parties filed more than a dozen actions against each other. In 2020 the Placer County Superior Court entered judgment for Charley, finding he was entitled to damages and judicial foreclosure. Murphy’s appeal was dismissed, a writ of sale issued in 2021, and she pursued bankruptcy proceedings and applications to delay the sale. The record does not show whether the property has been sold.
In her first amended complaint, Murphy alleged that she suffered a stroke because of depositions Henderson conducted, that Charley harassed her physically, that Damon recorded a lien on the property, and that the state court denied unspecified accommodations when she appeared with a service dog at the 2020 trial. She pleaded eight causes of action, including a section 1983 bodily-integrity claim, an ADA claim, violation of a bankruptcy discharge injunction, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, defamation, and slander of title. These are allegations only; the court made no findings that they are true.
The court had earlier denied a temporary restraining order and dismissed the original complaint with leave to amend, concluding that the claims against Charley were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Smith defendants and the County then moved to dismiss the amended complaint. Murphy did not timely respond to the County’s motion and instead sought leave to add claims against the Placer County Sheriff’s Office over an alleged foreclosure auction and an alleged unpaid surplus of about $25,807.
The Court’s Holding
This is a magistrate judge’s order and findings and recommendations, not a final judgment. The only operative orders vacate the October 29, 2026 hearing and deny Murphy’s request to reset it as moot. Judge Peterson recommends that both motions to dismiss be granted without leave to amend, that the motion to amend be denied, and that judgment be entered and the case closed. A district judge must decide whether to adopt the recommendations, and objections are due within fourteen days.
As to the Smith defendants, the court found that Rooker-Feldman bars claims against Charley, Henderson, and Winged “S” Ranch that complain of injury from the state judgment, including the bodily-integrity, abuse of process and fraud, malicious prosecution, defamation, slander of title, and tortious interference claims. The abuse of process claim against the other Smith defendants alleged no independent wrongdoing, and the lien reconveyance claim against Damon would require Murphy to show she owns the property, which the state judgment precludes. The discharge-injunction claim was recommended for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because, under Ninth Circuit authority, it must be raised by motion in the bankruptcy case, not in an adversary proceeding.
As to the County, the ADA claim identified no accommodation requested or denied and, to the extent it attacks the state court’s credibility finding or a court-ordered denial, is barred by Rooker-Feldman. The abuse of process claim alleged no County conduct and is barred by California Government Code section 815(a). Amendment was found futile because the proposed Sheriff’s Office claims would not cure existing defects and, once the existing claims are dismissed, would rest on state statutes with no apparent federal-question or diversity jurisdiction.
Key Takeaways
- Rooker-Feldman can reach tort and civil-rights claims, not just direct appeals, when the plaintiff’s asserted injury is caused by a state-court judgment.
- In the Ninth Circuit, a claim that a creditor violated a bankruptcy discharge injunction must be brought by motion in the bankruptcy case rather than in a separate federal suit.
- Common-law tort claims against a California public entity face Government Code section 815(a), which requires a statutory basis for liability.
- A pro se plaintiff may be denied leave to amend when the proposed amendment would not cure the defects or would turn the case into a different one over which the court appears to lack jurisdiction.
- Because this is only a recommendation, nothing is final until the district judge acts.
Why It Matters
The recommendation shows how a federal court may treat repeated attempts to relitigate a state foreclosure judgment under new labels, including civil-rights, disability, and tort theories. It is an unpublished magistrate recommendation with no precedential weight, and it addresses only this record.
If adopted, the dismissal would end the federal case without leave to amend. The order does not decide any matter in the state or bankruptcy courts, and it does not resolve the merits of the proposed Sheriff’s Office claims.