Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Kiriaki Moshogiannis filed this action on October 14, 2026, after being locked out of her San Jose apartment on October 13 during an eviction proceeding. She alleged she was improperly evicted in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, applied to proceed in forma pauperis, and moved for a temporary restraining order to stay the eviction and reinstate her to the apartment.
The underlying state court action began on May 26, 2026, when 2580 Casa Real LP filed an unlawful detainer complaint in Santa Clara County Superior Court. Casa Real alleged that Moshogiannis leased the apartment on September 19, 2025, fell behind on rent, and owed $4,995.04 in back rent. On September 14, 2026, the state court entered judgment awarding Casa Real possession, outstanding rent, and damages. On September 22, Moshogiannis received a notice to vacate, and six days later moved in state court to set aside the judgment, citing lack of due process, improper notice, a pending ADA appeal, and a related criminal investigation. On October 13, a sheriff issued a notice of restoration returning the apartment to Casa Real.
Moshogiannis filed her federal complaint the next day, claiming her ADA rights were violated. She asserted she was falsely accused of owing rent, wrongly evicted, and not notified of a court hearing. Her complaint consisted of eight handwritten pages with 125 pages of attachments, and her TRO motion consisted of nine handwritten pages with 22 pages of attachments.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted Moshogiannis's IFP application but dismissed her complaint with leave to amend. The complaint violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires a short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief. The court found confused and disjointed allegations rather than clear statements, and noted she attached over one hundred pages of exhibits without explaining their relevance. She also failed to state a cognizable ADA claim, as it was unclear how her extortion allegation related to the ADA.
The court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes federal courts from hearing de facto appeals from state court judgments. A claim is inextricably intertwined when the federal claim succeeds only if the state court erred, or the relief would reverse the state court decision. Moshogiannis sought to reverse the state court's judgment by asserting she paid rent and lacked notice, so Rooker-Feldman barred review. The appropriate forum was state court.
Because this was the court's first ruling and Moshogiannis was self-represented, the court granted leave to amend with a deadline of November 13, 2026, but warned it could dismiss without further leave if she failed to plausibly allege a claim. The court denied the TRO because she failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits or raise serious questions, and because the eviction had concluded and reinstatement would overrule the state court judgment.
Key Takeaways
- Federal courts lack jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to hear de facto appeals from state court judgments, including challenges to eviction orders.
- Pro se complaints must still comply with Rule 8's requirement of a short and plain statement, and voluminous unexplained exhibits do not satisfy this standard.
- To obtain a TRO, a plaintiff must show likelihood of success on the merits or raise serious questions going to the merits; a complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim cannot support injunctive relief.
Why It Matters
This order illustrates the strict application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar federal challenges to state court eviction judgments. Even when a tenant frames the claim as a violation of federal rights under the ADA, federal courts cannot serve as appellate courts for state eviction proceedings. The decision reinforces that tenants seeking to overturn eviction judgments must pursue relief in state court rather than filing duplicative federal actions.
The order also demonstrates the screening process for in forma pauperis complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which requires courts to dismiss claims that fail to state a claim. The court's grant of leave to amend reflects the liberal construction afforded to pro se litigants, but the warning that further amendment may not be permitted underscores that pro se status does not excuse failure to comply with basic pleading requirements.